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“Should Market Liberalization precede Democracy? Causal Relations 
between Political Preferences and Development” 
Pauline Grosjean1 and Claudia Senik2 
21 June 2007 
Summary 
This paper is dedicated to the relation between market development and democracy. We 
distinguish contexts and preferences and ask whether it is true that the demand for democracy 
only emerges after a certain degree of market development is reached, and whether, 
conversely, democratization is likely to be an obstacle to the acceptation of market 
liberalization. Our study hinges on a new survey rich in attitudinal variables: the Life in 
Transition Survey (LITS) conducted in 2006 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the World Bank, in 28 post-Transition countries. 
Our identification strategy consists in relying on the specific situation of frontier-zones. We 
find that democracy enhances the support for market development whereas the reverse is not 
true. Hence, the relativist argument according to which the preference for democracy is an 
endogenous by-product of market development  is not supported by our data. 
 
Keywords: market and democracy, sequencing of development, Transition economies, 
attitudinal variables, cross-countries survey. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the unexpected side-effects of China’s spectacular emergence is the diffusion of a new 
conventional wisdom concerning the sequencing of political and economic reforms in 
developing countries. Essentially, the idea is that early democratization can be harmful. The 
continued hold of the Chinese Communist Party over political power is taken to be a positive 
ingredient in the construction of a viable market economy, as opposed to the erratic reform 
path experienced by Central and European countries of the former socialist block, which 
predominantly chose rapid economic and political liberalization in the 1990’s (Dewatripont 
and Roland, 1992; Godoy and Stiglitz, 2006; Roland and Verdier, 2003). Another example is 
Latin America, where pervasive economic crises seem to illustrate the danger that democracy 
can be an obstacle to the development of the market when leaders have to impose unpopular 
reforms while being responsible in front of their constituencies. It follows that the optimal 
route is to develop market institutions in a first stage of development, and consider 
democratization at a latter stage. 
Pushing the argument one step further, some authors have argued that the desire for political 
freedom and democratic institutions does not arise until the countriesy reach a certain degree 
of material comfort and market liberalization (Lipset, 1959; Miller et al. 1996). Hence, the 
argument goes, not only is it preferable to postpone democracy to advanced stages of a 
country’s economic development, but this sequence also meets citizens’ preferences.  
Some observers may find it difficult to reconcile this relativist statement with the recent vivid 
public demonstrations in favor of democratization in countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), e.g. Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, and in China. In terms of scientific  
evidence, the empirical literature devoted to the relationship between market and democracy 
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remains rather inconclusive. Most studies are unable to draw a clear direction of causality 
because of the interdependent dynamics followed by the two variables along the history of 
any given country. Hence, in spite of the strong dynamism of this research field, the scientific 
consensus on these issues is still in the making.  
This paper tries to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between political 
preferences and development. We exploit a new set of micro evidence from an original 
survey of 28 Transition economies, the Life in Transition Survey, which was implemented in 
summer 20063.  
We first try to isolate the causal relation running from actual democratization to the demand 
for market liberalization. Our empirical identification strategy relies on the specificities of 
frontier-zones. Our main assumption is that people who live in an integrated frontier-zone 
share the same experience of the market and, often, the same historically inherited “cultural 
attitudes” towards the market and democracy, on both sides of the frontier. This is 
particularly plausible for the (often artificial) frontiers of the former USSR and in some 
formerly integrated regions such as the Ottoman Empire or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
This assumption is tantamount to keeping constant the usually omitted variables that bias any 
estimation of the relation between market development and the support to democracy.  
Reciprocally, we try to assess the relation that runs from actual market development to 
popular demand for democracy. Here, we exploit within-country regional variations. We rely 
on the fact that the degree of market development is notoriously different across regions of 
the survey; whereas people who live in the same country share a common experience of 
democracy. Hence, we regress the preference for democracy on an index of regional market 
development, reflecting the share of the modern sector of the economy, which is composed of 
private and smaller size firms. We also compare the support to democracy of the various 
frontier-zones inside a given country, on the grounds that market development at borders are 
partly exogenous, as it is influenced by the neighbouring region’s market development. 
The main result of this paper is that, contrary to leading conjectures, democracy appears to 
generate some popular support for the market, while economic liberalization does not clearly 
                                                 
3 See EBRD, Life in Transition, a Survey of People’s Experiences and Attitudes, May 2007.  
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raise the support for democracy. To be sure, this finding only suggests that democracy 
increases the subjective support to the market; it does not mean that democracy does not 
complicate the task of reformers, with the risk of impeding market liberalization. Our results 
also cast doubt on the idea that democracy would naturally emerge as a by-product of 
capitalism. Even if the demand for democracy increases with individual income, market 
liberalization as such does not seem to be sufficient to trigger the demand for 
democracymodernisation of the industrial structure of the economy seems to have no impac 
seems to vest the interests of the poor in politics and make them more supportive of 
democracy. A minima, the take-home message of the paper is that one cannot advocate the 
preferences of citizens to postpone the construction of democratic institutions. 
Section 2 discusses the background literature in the reciprocal linkages between economic 
and political liberalization. Section 3 presents the identification strategies. Section 4 presents 
the data and Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background 
The conventional wisdom concerning the lLinkages between political and economic systems 
and in particular between democratisation and market liberalisation haves been widely 
studiedchanged over time. . While the eaearly XIXth century was predominantly skeptical 
about septicism about the compatibility between democracy and capitalism (see J.S. Mill or 
K. Marx4), today, the consensuswisdom is that development leads to both a market economy 
and to political democracy5 with anteriority of the market. The idea that “modern democracy 
is a by-product of the capitalist process”6 dates back to Toqueville (1839), who stressed that 
market development is conducive to democracy because it provides the “social space within 
which individuals, groups and entire institutional complexes can develop independent of state 
control”7. Lipset (1959) claims that: “industrialization, urbanization, high educational 
standards and a steady increase in the overall wealth of society [are] a basic condition 
                                                 
4 Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. In Utilitarianism, Liberty, and 
Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton. London: Dent, 1860. Karl Marx (1867) Capital, Vol. 1 A Critique 
of Political Economy, ed. Penguin Classique London, 1990.  
5  This idea was namely  Hence the concept of the “End of History” (Fukuyama 1992 ). 
6 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, Harper and Bros., 1942). 
7 A. de Toqueville (1839), Democracy in America, vol. 2 (New York : Vintage :1945).  
 5
sustaining democracy”. 
Historically, market economies have emerged existed both in the context of democracy and 
autocratic regimes, but there is no example of a socialist economy under within a democratic 
regime has been observed. This observation lies at the foundation of a certain “instrumental” 
view of political regimes is . In the context of the political economy literature of Transition 
(Aslund et al., 2001; Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Roland, 2001; Roland and Verdier, 
2003), researchers have focuseds on the question of how to overcome the on political 
opposition to reforms, and in particular the opposition to economic liberalization. This 
literature discusses the relative advantages and drawbackspros and cons of democracy and 
versus authoritarianism for from the point of view of facilitating economic reforms and 
growth (for a review, see Roland, 2001; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). Here, the causality 
runs from the political regime to the development of the market.  
Beyond these theoretical models, what can we learn from empirical studies? To date, the 
existing empirical literature does not offer many reliable clear-cut results. concerned with the 
linkages between democracy and economic liberalisationMany studies focus on the aggregate 
relationship between democracy or economic liberalization and economic growth. 
Concerning the relation running from political liberalization to growth, Barro (1990) suggests 
that the relationship between GDP and democracy is curvilinear and Minier (2001) finds that 
the probability of that emergence of a democratic movement emerges in an authoritarian 
regime is increasing in income per capita up to a level of approximately US$5000. However, 
these results are contradicted by However, Przeworski (2004), who finds that transition from 
authoritarian regime to democracy is not influenced by income levels, once initial conditions 
are controlled for8. He argues that the observed relationship between income and democratic 
political regimes is due almost exclusively to the. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) review 18 
studies and 21 findings of concerning the impact of political systems on growth, among 
which eight are in favor of democracy, eight in favor of authoritarianism and five conclude to 
no difference. As underlined by Persson and Tabellini (2007b), “the findings are essentially 
all over the place” with regards to whether democracy shapes economic development (see 
                                                 
8 Przeworski argues that the observed relationship between national income and democratic regimes is an 
artefact; it is due almost exclusively to the higher durability of any political regime under a higher national 
income. Hence what is observed in richer countries is not more frequent transitions to democracy but more 
durable democratic regimes. 
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also, among many, Barro, 1990; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Helliwel, 1994; Leblang, 
1997; Przeworski, 2004). 
The study of the reverse causality is similarly unconvincing and.  Przeworski and Limongi 
(1993) argue that most of these empirical studies suffer from a simultaneity bias. Evidence 
based on cross- section aggregate data suggests that education and income are the strongest 
channels towards democracy (La Porta et al., 1999). However, in two related papers, 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2004a, 2004b) invalidate this view finding by 
showing that the impact of education and income becomes insignificant once within-country 
variation and endogeneity of income are taken into account. The authors conclude that cross-
section correlations between democracy and education or income are due to an omitted 
variable bias. This omitted variable, they suggest, consists of the initial institutions that have 
presided over the country’s development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). This 
problem of omitted variable is pervasive in this entire literature. 
Some authors have tried to overcome this obstacle using matching, propensity scores and 
differences in differences methods, exploiting both the cross-country and time series 
variations in aggregate datasets. Persson and Tabelini (2007a) show that democratic regimes 
have an important impact on growth but that this relation is conditional on the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the countries under study. Persson and Tabellini (2007b) show that longer 
time spans of democracy are a factor of economic development. Persson and Tabellini (2006) 
suggest that some forms of democracy (presidential) are more development friendly than 
others (parliamentary)². Rodrick and Wacziarg (2005) find that democratic transitions exert a 
positive impact on growth in the short run, especially in the poorest countries; it also reduces 
economic volatility. Other papers, e.g. Sachs and Werner (1995) or Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003) have tried to elucidate the relation from economic liberalization to growth.  
A few papers address directly the question of the interplay between democratization and 
economic liberalization using aggregate data. Among those, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) 
find that both kinds of reforms have mutual feedbacks on one another, although causality is 
more likely to run from democratization to economic liberalization. However, they conclude 
to the superiority of a sequencing based on market liberalization first, from the point of view 
of growth: “Countries that first liberalize and then become democracies do much better than 
countries that pursue the opposite sequence”. 
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Another set of studies has focused on the support for democracy and market economy at 
based on the individual datalevel. At the individual level, Surveys try ies to confirm the 
predictions that individuals who support a free market economy are hypothesised to be those 
more likely to embrace democratic principles (Mc Intosh et al., 1994). The channels of the 
impact of economic development on democracy identified by theThis can be because it is in 
the best self-interest of the wealthiest individuals to support democracy: as they benefit from 
market development, they seek political representation to protect their newfound economic 
opportunities. Alternatively, modernisation theory, such as education, income, being an urban 
resident or an entrepreneur, should translate at the individual level and should constitute the 
main determinants of the demand for democracy. The alternative hypothesis to the self-
interest demand for democracy is that attitudes towards the market economy can be 
determined by the political socialization of individuals and that the demand for democracy 
responds to symbolic motives (Citrin et al, 1990; Easton, 1965).  
In the case of Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990’s, Gibson (1996) find support 
for the latter hypothesis and argues that economic values are not primary and that democratic 
institutions are valued for their intrinsic characteristics. In the case of Russia, it even appears 
that attitude towards democratic institutions have a greater influence on economic attitudes 
than the other way around. HoweverW, with the exception of Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), 
most studies related to Central and Eastern Europe find evidence in accordance with the 
modernisation theory and conclude that the support for democracy and democratic 
institutions is highest among the better educated urban residents (Brym, 1996; Mason, 1995; 
Mc Intosh et al. 1992; Miller et al. 1994 and 1996;) and those most satisfied with the 
performance of the economy (Mishler and Rose, 1994). However,  
However,most although studies based on of individual data do not suffer from the attrition 
and, to a certain extent, from the selection bias put forward by Przeworski and Limongi 
(1993), they nonetheless suffer from an identification problem similar simultaneity bias.. This 
is contained in the very idea of the modernization theory that  If therethe same development 
dynamics  is a common opinion trend toward favoring both democracy and a market 
development.economy, and if economic liberalisation implies political liberalisation, which 
itself promotes economic freedom, the study of the determinants of political and economic 
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liberalisation, whereas at the aggregate or at the individual level, suffer from a simultaneity 
bias that hinders any empirical assessment. Recovering Assessing the direction of causality 
between the advancement of economic freedom and that the degree of political freedom 
appears to be an almost impossible exercise in the absence of a valid exogenous instrument, 
which needs to be traced back at least as far back as the legal or colonial origins (Acemoglu 
et al.., 2001).  
In this paper, we try to overcome this simultaneity bias. We do not pretend to explain the long 
run causality between democracy and market development; instead we restrict our interest to 
the short run causality running from the state of market development to the demand for 
democracy, and, conversely, from political democracy to the support to the market.In this 
paper, we however propose to study how the state of one dimension influences the demand 
for the other dimension, by using sources of exogeneity in the state of economic or political 
freedom.  We ask whether it is true that the demand for democracy only emerges after a 
certain degree of market development is reached, and whether, conversely, democratization is 
more likely to be an obstacle or an ingredient to citizens’ support to market liberalization. 
 
 
 
 
3. Identification strategy 
We address the general question of the direction of causality between market and democracy 
by distinguishing contexts and preferences. We try to assess the direction of causality from 
existing democracy to the support for the market and from existing market liberalization to 
the support for democracy.In order to discern the direction of causality between market and 
democracy, one would ideally need to rely on a situation in which one variable is 
exogenously “frozen” while the other randomly takes different values across countries. Of 
course, in the real world there are many reasons why this ideal setting could never exist. On 
the contrary it is obvious that market liberalization and democracy are processes that follow 
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highly intertwined dynamic evolutions and depend on countries’ historical background.  
Even in the case of Transition countries, where democracy and the market have been both 
abolished by the communist experience, the development and the popular support to these 
institutions have evolved in parallel since 1989, probably under the influence of common 
factors. As an illustration, Figure 1 shows the strong general cross-country relation between 
the average support to the market and the average support to democracy in the 28 countries 
covered by the Life in Transition Survey. Regional differences are also visible. In particular, 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, which are both the closest to a free 
market and a full-blown democracy, are the most supportive of the two processes. Identical 
factors, such as the perspective of accessing the European Union, are likely to have driven the 
two attitudes simultaneously.  
 
Figure 1. Support for the Market and for Democracy 9 
                                                 
9 Percentage of respondents who chose the market (respectively democracy) as the best system of organisation 
of the economic (respectively political) system, see section 4. 
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Obviously, using the pooled cross-section data of the LITS survey and running a naive 
regression of the support to democracy on an index of market development, or of the support 
to the market on a democratic index, would run into serious identification problems. The 
relation put in evidence would not readily be interpretable in terms of causality as it would be 
subject to the influence of omitted variables affecting both market development and 
democracy. We propose two different identification strategies in order to isolate the direction 
of causality from market development to the support to democracy and vice-versa. 
 
 
3.1.The identification problem 
How can one hope to discern the direction of causality between market and democracy? 
Ideally, one would like to be able to rely on a situation in which one variable is exogenously 
“frozen” while the other randomly takes different values across countries. Of course, in the 
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real world there are many reasons why this ideal setting could never exist and is just 
meaningless. The most important reason is that it would be hard to convince anyone that the 
reason why the market or democracy is underdeveloped in some countries is exogenous. The 
reasons that hindered the development of democracy cannot be completely independent from 
the determinants of market liberalization and vice-versa. In other words, it is hard to imagine 
that in the real world, the state of democracy and market development are (i) independent and 
(ii) the fruit of exogenous random shocks. On the contrary it is obvious that market 
liberalization and democracy are processes that follow highly intertwined dynamic evolutions 
and depend on the countries’ historical backgrounds.  
Can the experience of communism and the following period of Transition be considered as of 
some help with this regard? To be sure, democracy and the market have been both abolished 
by the communist experience and one could consider as a crude approximation that all the 
countries of the former Soviet block and its satellites started at the same point in 1989. Of 
course, this is not quite true and it is well-known that there were marked differences between 
for instance Poland and Czechoslovakia, the former being more decentralized and the second 
more strictly conform to the pure Soviet model. But even if all countries of the former 
communist block were considered identical up to 1989, the evolution that they have known 
since that date cannot be thought to be exogenous; the development of market and democracy 
has evolved in parallel since 1989, probably under the influence of common factors. 
However, the specificity of the socialist block is the parallelism in the history of the 
constituent countries. Diverging forces have been unleashed only since the early 1990’s, and 
in contexts that continue sharing many similarities due to the identical Transition process that 
is going on. Hence, comparing the attitudes towards the market and the democracy of these 
countries is less farfetched than in other contexts. In more technical terms, when analyzing 
the relation between democracy and the market, the risk is high of omitting important 
variables, but the variation of these omitted variables is certainly smaller inside the 
considered group of Transition countries than it would be in a more general cross-country 
comparative study. 
Figure 1 in annex shows that, despite the strong positive correlation between support to the 
market and support to democracy in all transition countries, there are some noticeable 
differences among the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics (CEB) and 
South Eastern Europe (SEE).  and the BalticsEBThe former, which are most advanced 
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towards a free market democracy are also much more supportive of the two values. Of 
course, the relationship between preferences for democracy and for the market is not very 
informative, as identical factors, such as, in this example, adhesion to the European Union, 
are likely to drive the two attitudes simultaneously.  
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[*autre idée: utiliser UE non UE en supposant que adhésion à l’UE est exogène.] 
de toutes façons il faut faire des stat des à un moment dans l’article pour voir si demo+ Ù 
market+ et le lien avec la situation avant 1989 et le lien avec la perspective d’adhésion à 
l’UE. 
Similarly, in spite of the comforting thought about the common fate of Transition countries, 
and even if differentiation factors, such as EU adhesion can be assumed to be exogenous, 
using the pooled cross-section data and running a regression of the support to democracy on 
an index of market development would run into serious identification problems. The relation 
put in evidence would: 
-not readily be interpretable in terms of causality but rather as a mere co-variation between 
the two variables 
-be subject to the influence of omitted variables susceptible of affecting both market 
development and democracy 
-be subject to reverse causation problems. 
Of course this is one of the usual problems of cross-section analysis, which researcher have 
traditionally tried to surmount by looking for an “instrument” of either variable, i.e. looking 
for some exogeneity that helps exiting this reasoning circularity. We propose two different 
identification strategies in order to isolate the direction of causality from market development 
to the support to democracy and vice-versa. 
3.2.3.1. Democracy and the dDemand for the market 
Is a higher degree of democracy an obstacle to reform, or does it increase the support to 
market development? In order to address this question, we need to overcome the problem that 
people’s support to the market may be due both to the degree of democracy and to the degree 
of the market development itself, both variables being likely to develop at a parallel pace. 
More generally, it can be suspected that common “cultural factors” influence the national 
attitudes towards both the market and democracy.   
We thus need to find an instrument that captures the development of democracy without 
being influenced by the degree of market development. This will allows us to identify 
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differential attitudes to the market for people who, in an exogenous way, are exposed to 
different levels of democracy, although they are exposed to the same degree of market 
liberalization development.  
 
In other words, one would like to estimate the naive equation (1):  
Ssupport for market ij = a0 + a1 degree of development of democracy ij + a2 Xij + a3Cj + ui (1) 
but suspects that the true relation is (1’): 
Ssupport for market ij = a0 + a1 degree of development of democracy ij + a3 degree of 
development of market ij + a2 Xij + a3Cj + ui (1’)upport for 
market ij = a0 + a1 degree of development of democracy j + a2 degree of development of market 
j + a3 cultural factors j + a4 Xij + a5 Cj + ui (1’) 
 
where Xijj stands for socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent i in country j, Cj is a 
vector of country dummies and ui the error term. 
Our strategy consists in trying to find a way of keeping the second and third terms of equation 
(1’) constant. As our analysis is based on individual data, we need to find people who, in an 
exogenous way, are exposed to different levels of democracy but to the same degree of 
market development and who share the same “culture” regarding the politico-economic 
system.  
Our strategy consists in trying to find a way of keeping the third term of equation (1’) 
constant. 
Our The idea is to match observations in frontier-zones. We make use of the spatial 
integration of regions which stand on both sides of a given frontier, at the immediate 
proximity of the border. We assume that people who live in open the close vicinity of a 
frontier-zones share the same culture and the same perception of market development even if 
though they live on both sides of itthe frontier.  
This relies on three types of arguments. The first one is the well-documented high level of 
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interregional trade in frontier zones. Secondly, it is well known that in such regions, when it 
is possible, people do not hesitate, when it is possible, to cross the frontier to go to working, 
to buy their daily shopping, or to buy cheaper appliances or and cars, hence regional 
integration is a fact of their everyday life, which certainly influences their perception of the 
market when lower local tax rates make it advantageous. MoreoverThird, in the specific case 
of the 21 former Soviet Republics, regional integration was a hard fact until the early 1990’s: 
under the socialist system, the economy of the Soviet Republics was submitted to the 
centralized organization of material resources by the Soviet plan based in Moscow. Many 
countries, in particular in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have inherited from the Soviet 
Union an integrated network of infrastructures, which is aare positive factors of trade and 
regional integration (Broadman, 2005). We thus assume that inhabitants of a certaingiven 
frontier-zones share the same experience of the market even when they live in different 
countries with different political institutions.  
Clearly, the validity of our assumption relies on the level of market integration across the 
borders of the surveyed countries. We thus distinguish open frontiers from those that are 
closed or restricted because of political conflicts or geographical obstacles. We also check 
that the degree of market development is more similar in adjacent frontier-zones than it is in 
pairs of adjacent countries.  
Market integration at frontier-zones is useful to eliminate the risk that the support to the 
market, that is measured reflects the actual development of the market. What about the 
“cultural” omitted variable? A first element is that the citizens of the former Socialist block, 
and in particular of the Soviet Union, have been living for 45 to 70 years in a common 
political system marked by strong official ideological values concerning the market. Hence, 
we can assume that they share a common heritage in terms of attitudes towards the market 
(Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 20065). Beyond this remark, we rely on the fact that current 
frontiers of many transition countries, especially countries of the CIS, are more or less 
artificial divisions of formerly integrated jurisdictions, whose citizens have developed 
common attitudes concerning both market development and political freedom (e.g. the 
Austro-Hungarian empire, the Ottoman Empire, etc.). The very idea of “culture” and more 
specifically “national culture” is that countries’ past experience continues to exert some 
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effects in the long run10.  We thus rely on the idea that citizens of countries which have 
belonged to formerly highly integrated zones share a common culture, i.e. common inherited 
general attitudes towards the market and democracy.  
There are some subsets of Transition countries in which this assumption is particularly 
appealing. Countries that have belonged to the Ottoman Empire (Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia) have developed under the same rule 
for several centuries (1299-1922). The same can be said about countries of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, 1867-
1918), countries of the former Polish Empire (which included Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, 
Belarus and parts of Russia, 1569-1795), countries of the USSR (1922-1991), or countries of 
the Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) who 
shared the same rule for several decades (1918-1991). We thus retain these cultural grouping 
in order to deal with the potential impact of cultural factors on the demand for democracy.  
 
 . 
In the dataset, we identify 44 frontiers-zones with quasi-adjacent Primary Sample Units 
(PSU)s of the survey located on the twoboth sides of the frontier (less than 30 km from each 
other). For each couple of countries corresponding to a given frontier, we use the democracy 
score established by Freedom House Nations in Transit 2006 (Freedom House, 
2006a)Freedom House (refref). In another specification, we use a dummy variable that 
indicates which of the two countries is “more democratic”, according to this ranking.   
Our test thus consists, for all pairs of observations at frontier zones, in regressing the 
individual support to the market on this index of democratic development, controlling for 
frontier zone dummies and other socio-demographic controls. The assumptions of (i) market 
                                                 
10 In Bisin and Verdier (2000) or Fernandez and Fogli (2005), culture is can be defined as a long term inertia in 
preferences. 
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integration and (ii) common culture at the frontier between two formerly integrated countries 
mean that the third and fourth terms of equation (1’) are constant and hence need not be 
included in the regression. We thus run the following regression on the sub-samples of 
frontier zones: 
Support for market ijk = a0 + a1 Democracy Level j +  a4 Xi + a5 Zk + ui (1’’) 
where Democracy Level j corresponds to the democracy score of country j,  Xi stands for 
socio-demographic characteristics of respondent i, Zk is a vector of frontier zone dummies 
and ui the error term. In an alternative specification, we run the same regression on a dummy 
variable indicating whether the country of residence of an individual is more democratic (or 
not) than the adjacent country. 
3.2. Demand for democracy 
In order to identify the determinants of the demand for democracy, we need to overcome the 
symmetrical problem, i.e. to isolate the causation running from market liberalization to the 
support for democracy, avoiding the contamination of the actual degree of democracy already 
reached and the influence of “cultural factors”, i.e. keeping the second and third terms of 
equation (2) constant. 
Support for democracy ijj = b0 + ba1 degree of development of market  ij + b12 degree of 
development of democracy ij +  b3 cultural factors j + b24 Xijj + b35 Cj + ui (2’) 
Where Cj is a vector of country dummies. 
Here, we hinge both on frontier-zones and on regional and national variations. We rely on the 
fact that political institutions (and “culture”) are by definition the same in a given country, 
whereas market liberalization development is highly uneven across the various regions of a 
given country (refZhuravskaia, 2006;, EBRD, 2006), p. 12). We thus build indices of market 
liberalization at the regional level, and match individuals from the same country who live in 
regions that experience unequal degrees of market development. As explained in section 4.3, 
the constructed “industrial liberalization” score” reflects the regional development of private, 
small and medium enterprises and the formal sector, which are characteristics of market 
development.  
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and an “industrial liberalisation” score that reflects the development of private, small and 
medium enterprises and the formal sectorHenceWe thus estimate the following equation: 
Support for democracy ijr = b0 + b1 degree of development of regional marketjr  + b4 Xij + b5 Cj 
+ ui (2’) 
Where index r refers to the administrative regions of country j. 
This strategy relies on the admittedly strong assumption that the uneven development of the 
market across regions of a country is not due to some regional variable that would also 
influence the support attitudes of the inhabitants of the region towards democracy by the 
inhabitants of the region. In order to lift this assumption, we use two strategies. First of all, 
we control for the type of residence of respondents ( in metropolitan, urban or rural areas). 
Second, we again rely on borders’ specificities. We assume that in the context of high 
regional economic integration at borders, the level of market development is strongly 
influenced by that of the adjacent country. Hence even inside a given country, we assume that 
market development at the borders vary in a way that is partly exogenous to citizens’ 
preferences for politico-economic values. We thus match individuals of the same country, 
who live in different frontier-zones, and we regress individual support for democracy on the 
level of market development in the different frontier-zones. To go one step further, in an 
alternative specification, we use as a proxy for market development in the frontier zone zj of 
country j the industrial liberalization score of the adjacent frontier-zone zk across the border, 
in country k. We thus estimate the following regressions:  
Support for democracy ijk = b0 + b1 degree of development of regional marketzl  + b4 Xij + b5 Cj 
+ ui (3’) 
With l=j,k, and where z refers to the frontier-zone of, alternatively, country j and k.  
Of course, even using these identifications strategies, we do not pretend to escape the 
influence of long term determinants of economic and political development. Having belonged 
to the Ottoman Empire versus the Austro-Hungarian Empire certainly continues to influence 
the degree of adhesion to democracy and to market mechanisms up to the 21st century.  
Neutralizing these long term trends would imply finding an instrument that could 
approximate the exogenous ultimate origin of these differences. This limits the validity of our 
 19
conclusions to short term relevance. Hence, the causality effects that we put in evidence 
should not be interpreted as long term processes but rather as some piece of evidence of the 
short term dynamic relations between these variables. More precisely, we ask, at a given 
point of time, whether the causality really runs with an identical force in the two directions 
between democracy and market development, or whether there is an asymmetry in the 
influence of one variable on the other. 
4. Data 
Our study hinges on the Life in Transition Survey (LITS), a survey conducted by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank in 2006, in 285 
post-Transition countries and Turkey11and Turkey (including Turkey and excluding 
Turkmenistan)..  
Respondents to the survey were drawn randomly, using a two stage sampling method, with 
census enumeration areas as primary sampling units, and households as secondary sampling 
units. The survey includes 1000 observations per country, for a total of 29000 observations. 
The sample of respondents is equally balanced in terms of gender, but is biased in favor of 
elder people: the age of the respondents varies from 17 to 97 years old, with a means of 46 
years old. All descriptive statistics are presented in the Annex. 
4.1.  The support to the market and to democracy 
The support for the market is analyzed using the following question:  
Q3.10. with which one of the following statements do you agree most:  
- A market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system. 
- Under some circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a market 
economy. 
- For people like me, it does not matter whether the economic system is organized as a 
market economy or as a planned economy. 
We analyze the probability to choose any of the three modalities of questions q3.10.  
                                                 
11 Turkmenistan was not included in the survey. We exclude Turkey and We exclude Turkey from our sample, 
because of its very specific political situation, because of their very specific political situation. 
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4.2. The demand for democracy 
Concerning the support for democracy, we analyze the probability to choose either modalities 
of question Q.3.11:  with which one of the following statements do you agree most:  
- Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system. 
- Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a 
democratic one. 
- For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or 
authoritarian. 
We also study the determinants of the demand for more specific aspects of democracy, such 
as law and order, independence of the press or of the courts system (Q.3.12). Finally, we 
verify that the support to democracy comes with trust in democratic institutions, using 
question q3.03 (see section 5.3). 
4.23.  Frontier-zones 
The LITS survey is based on Primary Sample Units12, each containing 20 observations 
(surveyed persons). We use the geographical map of the survey in order to identify groups of 
PSUs which are located on both sides and in the immediate vicinity of a political frontier. We 
identify 37 frontier-zones that contains from 40 to 460 observations, concentrated in 2 
(Slovakia-Ukraine) to 24 (Croatia-Slovenia) PSUs.  
The validity of our identification assumption relies on the intensity of market integration on 
either side of borders. This makes little doubt for the new ten EU members, among which 
goods and persons are free to circulate. This is also true of many neighboring countries in 
most part of Central, Eastern Europe and South Eastern Europe (for example the Slovak and 
the Czech Republics; Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro13; Bulgaria and Macedonia or 
Moldova and Romania). Many countries of the sample are integrated in Euro-Regions, the 
purpose of which is to promote trans-frontier cooperation14. Even the relationships between 
                                                 
12 Primary Sampling Units were selected randomly, with probability proportional to size.  
13 As well as Kosovo, but Kosovo was excluded from our sample.   
14 For example,  Albania, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia are part of the Adriatic 
Euroregion; Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia are part of the Baltic Euroregion (alongside with Sweden and 
Denmark); the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia constitute the Beskydy Mountains Eeuro region; and trade 
among Hungary, Romania, and Serbia is facilitated in the Danube - Kris - Mures - Tisza Eeuroregion. 
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countries of the former Yugoslavia have eased to a large extent in the last few years, with, for 
example, the relaxation of visa procedures between Serbia and Croatia in 2003. Two CIS 
countries: Belarus and Ukraine are also integrated in Euro-Regions15. This implies deeper 
cross border integration between these neighbor countries, despite the relative closeness of 
Ukraine and Belarus. These countries are also largely integrated with Russia, historically and 
formally, in the Neman Euro-Region that also includes Lithuania and Poland. 
In the particular case of Central Asia and the Caucasus, patterns of trade have changed less 
rapidly than in Eastern Europe (Babetskii et al, 2003; Broadman, 2005). While the costs of 
intra-regional trade have likely increased with the creation of independent countries (Djankov 
and Freund, 2000) and by the recent nationalist stance of some countries, such as Uzbekistan, 
these countries appear to be “overtrading” among themselves16. Using relative prices of a 
bundle of goods to complement official trade data, Grafe et al. (2005) show that the impact of 
borders on trade between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is much smaller 
than what the view of cumbersome crossing border procedures and licensing systems would 
imply. The authors attribute this result to the large development of shuttle trade in this region.  
We leave out of our sample frontiers that are impaired by geographical obstacles or either 
restricted or closed because of political tensions and disputed territories. We thus exclude the 
frontiers between Georgia and Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine, as 
well as all Uzbek borders.  
De facto, we verify that the degree of market development is more similar between two 
adjacent frontier-zones than it is in average between two adjacent countries. We calculate, for 
each frontier-zone between two countries i and j of the survey, the index of market 
development (defined infra in section 4.3) of frontier-zone i and frontier-zone j, and of 
country i and country j in average. Table 1 shows that on average, the correlation between 
indices of industrial market development is twice as high concerning adjacent frontier-zones 
of the sample as it is between adjacent countries of the sample.  If one restricts the analysis to 
                                                 
15 Białowieża Forest Eeuroregion between Poland and Belarus, the BUG Eeuro-Region between Belarus, 
Poland, Ukraine, or the Carpathian Eeuro-Region between Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. 
16 Using relative prices of a bundle of goods to complement official trade data, Grafe et al. (2005) show that the 
impact of borders on trade between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is much smaller than 
what the view of cumbersome crossing border procedures and licensing systems would imply. The authors 
attribute this result to the large development of shuttle trade in this region. 
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subsets of formerly more integrated countries, the proximity between adjacent frontier-zones 
appears even higher. For instance, in central Asia, the correlation between two adjacent 
frontier-zones is 0.78 against 0.34 in two adjacent countries (row 5 of Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Industrial Market Development Indices at Frontier-Zones 
Correlation between industrial market development 
indices : 
Adjacent frontiers Adjacent countries 
Whole sample 0.68 0.46 
CIS 0.25 -0.02 
Baltic countries 0.87 0.49 
European Union 0.78 0.34 
Central Asia 0.78 0.11 
Former Yougoslavia 0.08 -0.28 
Former Ottoman Empire 0.11 -0.31 
Number of observations (frontier-zones): whole sample: 65; CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Tajikistan): 28; Baltic states: 8; EU: 28; 
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan): 5; Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia): 12; Former Ottoman Empire (Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia): 14.  
For each pair of frontier-zones between two countries i and j, the average industrial indices of market 
liberalization (cf infra) are calculated at the level of frontier zone i and frontier zone j and of country i and 
country j. 
 
 
 
4.3.4  Indices of market liberalization 
We build a regional industrial score of market liberalization, using questions about the 
respondents’ first, second and third jobs17. The score is the regional sum proportion of 
respondents who declare that they either: work in a small enterprise, work in a medium 
enterprise, work in a private firm, work in a newly created enterprise (since 1989), are self-
employed with more than 5 employees or have a formal labor contract. More precisely, the 
industrial score that we build is the sum of each of the sub-indicators mentioned above.  
During the socialist era, Soviet economies were distinguished by their exceptionally low 
proportion of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). The necessities of central planning 
                                                 
17 Multiple jobs are frequent in Transition countries. 
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favored the organization of production and distribution in large units. We thus interpret the 
presence of SMEs as an indicator of market development. The presence of private firms and 
newly created firms are also a sign of progress in the Transition, an essential aspect of which 
is the process of privatization of the formerly dominant state-owned sector and the 
elimination of former monopolies under the pressure of new competitive firms (Berkowitz 
and Jackson, 2005). Self-employed persons with at least 5 employees are also part of this new 
economic pattern that is typical of a market economy and was absent from the landscape of 
planned economies. We do not count self-employed persons without employees on the 
grounds that those are likely not to be small firms but rather forms of quasi unofficial 
economy or what is sometimes called “disguised unemployment” (Earle and Sakova, 2000). 
(ref). Finally, we interpret the existence of a labor contract as a sign that the person is 
working in the official sector rather than in the informal onesector, a sign of development of 
the market. This industrial regional score varies from 0 to 5 with an average of 2.37. 
The quality of these indices of market liberalization is limited by the lack of 
representativeness of the data at the regional level. However, there is no available alternative 
regional index of private sector development or market liberalization at the regional 
levelavailable for the whole regionset of countries. 
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5. Results 
Although simple correlations show that supporting the market and supporting democracy are 
highly correlated attitudes (the correlation coefficient between the first modality of question 
q3.10 and question q3.11 is 0,45), our identification strategies leads to a different picture. We 
find that democracy does increase the support to market liberalization, but that the reverse 
relation is not as clear-cut. This pattern is apparent even in descriptive statistics. Table A2 
shows that at frontier zones, the support for a market economy tends to be higher on the 
border of the country that enjoys a higher level of democracy (according to the Freedom 
House Nations in Transit ranking). Table A3 however shows that preferences for democracy 
within a given country do not seem to be consistently higher in the frontier zones where the 
market is most advanced.  
 
5.1. Democracy raises the support to the market 
Table 1 presents the general regressions of support to the market (equation 1’’) on, 
alternatively, the Freedom House Nations in Transit 2006 (Freedom House, 2006a) 
democracy index (Columns 1 to 3), and on a dummy variablen representing the relative 
advancement of democracy,indicator of development of democracy, i.e. on an index of 
democracy  for each group of PSUs located at the frontier-zones of the survey (Columns 4 to 
7). The Freedom House Nations in Transit 2006 (Freedom House, 2006a) democracy index 
takes values from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 
the lowest; we have recoded it in order to present the score of democracy in an ascending 
order. The constructed dummy variable attributes a score of 1 to the PSUs located in the most 
democratic country of each pair, and 0 to PSUs located in the country which fares worse in 
terms of the political scale, according to the Freedom House (Freedom House, 2006a and b), 
Polity IV (CIDCM, 2006) or other indicesexes (see Table A4 in the Annex).  For a given 
border we only first retain the PSUs that are located at the frontier-zone (30 km around the 
border). All regressions are thus performed on the sub-sample of people living in the close 
vicinity of common frontier-zones. We control for frontier zone dummies and we adjust 
standard errors for clustering on frontier zones. Finally, in Table A7 (Annex), the regressions 
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are performed within each border-zone. 
Columns 1 and 4 in Table 2 analyze the determinants of the probability to declare that “a 
market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system”. Both the coefficients 
on the democratic index and the more democratic dummy variable are significant. Column 1 
displays the marginal effect of a change in the Freedom House Nations in Transit democratic 
score, while the coefficient on the variable “more _democracycy” represents the effect of a 
discrete change of this dummy variable from 0 to 1 (on the probability to support the market).  
Hence, column 4 in Table 21 shows that conditionally on living in a frontier-zone, living on 
the “more democratic” side of the frontier increases the probability of supporting the market 
by about 8.4%.  
Columns 2 and 5 analyze the determinants of the probability to declare that “under some 
circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a market economy”.  Column 2 
shows that an incremental change in the democracy score does not significantly affect 
preferences for the market. However, the coefficient on the “more democracy” dummy 
variable is significant at 5%, as it captures more significant changes in democratic advances. 
Column 5 thus indicates that conditionally on living in a frontier zone, experiencing a more 
democratic regime reduces the probability of favoring a planned economy by roughly 6,7%. 
Finally, columns 3 and 6 analyze the probability of declaring that “for people like me, it does 
not matter whether the economic system is organized as a market economy or a planned 
economy”. It shows that democratic variation across frontier zones has no impact on such an 
attitude.   
Other rows of Table 2 display the other correlates of attitudes to the market. We distinguish 
three income categories (the richest, 30%, middle and poorest quantile inside each country), 6 
educational levels, white- collar workers versus blue- collar workersoccupational categories, 
and employment status (self-employed versus employees). Self-employed workers tend to be 
more supportive of the market, while elder people and the poorest 30% of the population are 
less so.  
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Table 21. Ddemocracy Iincreases the Ssupport to Mmarket Ddevelopment 
dprobit Rregressions of Ssupport to the Mmarket 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
 Market is 
preferable 
Plan is 
preferable 
Does not 
matter 
Market is 
preferable 
Plan is 
preferable 
Does not 
matter 
       
Democracy index 0.040*** -0.026 -0.012    
 [0.015] [0.019] [0.017]    
More democracy    0.084** -0.066** -0.015 
    [0.034] [0.028] [0.026] 
Adult (35-19) -0.068*** 0.052*** 0.018 -0.069*** 0.053*** 0.016 
 [0.015] [0.016] [0.018] [0.015] [0.016] [0.018] 
Mid-age (50-65) -0.094*** 0.056*** 0.042* -0.094*** 0.056*** 0.041* 
 [0.021] [0.020] [0.024] [0.020] [0.020] [0.023] 
Old (>65) -0.153*** 0.060** 0.089*** -0.158*** 0.063** 0.089*** 
 [0.024] [0.030] [0.025] [0.024] [0.030] [0.024] 
Poor -0.066*** -0.01 0.071*** -0.063*** -0.011 0.071*** 
 [0.018] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.015] [0.016] 
Rich 0.015 -0.004 -0.012 0.011 -0.001 -0.01 
 [0.021] [0.015] [0.014] [0.020] [0.014] [0.013] 
Male  -0.018 0.096*** -0.053 -0.014 0.100*** -0.060** 
 [0.032] [0.033] [0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] 
Compulsory education 0.04 0.132*** -0.129*** 0.047 0.131*** -0.135*** 
 [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.032] [0.033] 
Secondary education 0.056* 0.126*** -0.141*** 0.062** 0.125*** -0.144*** 
 [0.032] [0.028] [0.030] [0.031] [0.028] [0.027] 
Professional education 0.109*** 0.191*** -0.229*** 0.115*** 0.188*** -0.231*** 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.026] [0.033] [0.033] [0.024] 
University education 0.027 0.199*** -0.147*** 0.042 0.190** -0.151*** 
 [0.076] [0.076] [0.045] [0.078] [0.077] [0.042] 
Postgraduate education 0.051*** -0.002 -0.048*** 0.053*** -0.003 -0.049*** 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] 
Unemployed 0.003 -0.01 0.008 0.008 -0.014 0.009 
 [0.027] [0.028] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027] [0.024] 
Self employed 0.101*** -0.089*** -0.009 0.116*** -0.098*** -0.013 
 [0.027] [0.018] [0.025] [0.027] [0.018] [0.023] 
White collar worker 0.052 0.005 -0.069** 0.058 -0.004 -0.063** 
 [0.036] [0.027] [0.032] [0.036] [0.027] [0.031] 
Blue collar worker 0.003 0.027 -0.029 0.001 0.024 -0.021 
 [0.033] [0.028] [0.029] [0.032] [0.027] [0.028] 
Service worker 0.035 -0.009 -0.028 0.045 -0.017 -0.026 
 [0.033] [0.025] [0.033] [0.033] [0.024] [0.032] 
Farmer, farm worker 0.04 0.012 -0.044 0.059 -0.003 -0.05 
 [0.051] [0.032] [0.047] [0.050] [0.031] [0.045] 
Pensioner -0.012 0.005 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 
 [0.036] [0.021] [0.028] [0.036] [0.022] [0.028] 
Student 0.025 0.008 -0.033 0.031 0.001 -0.029 
 [0.059] [0.045] [0.043] [0.057] [0.043] [0.042] 
Housewife 0.05 -0.024 -0.024 0.062 -0.036 -0.024 
 [0.048] [0.028] [0.043] [0.048] [0.028] [0.042] 
Observations 6750 6750 6750 6970 6970 6970 
log likelihood -4254.41 -3691.65 -3982.12 -4391.74 -3796.55 -4041.41 
Pseudo R2 0.0696 0.0328 0.0754 0.0746 0.0331 0.0829 
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Controls: frontier zone dummies. 
Thus, even though more educated, wealthier and self-employed people are more supportive of the market, the 
interaction with democracy is not significant. The impact of living in a more democratic country does thus not 
seem to transit via social positions of citizens. 
 
Other mMain effects indicate that self-employed and white collar workers tend to be more supportive of the 
market, while elder people and the poorest 30% of the population is less so.  White collar and service workers 
are significantly more supportive of democracy, as well as, what is more surprising, farmers and farm workers. 
Omitted categories: young (17-34) average income, lowest education, employee, blue-collar worker, occupation 
in army. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on frontier zones. ?. 
 
Main effects: older and poorer favour less democracy, rich, white collar, self employed, 
service workers and farmers or farm workers favour more 
If one accepts the assumption that people living in a common frontier-zone share the same 
practical experience of market development (and the same background culture), the lesson of 
Table 2 shows is that living in a country with a higher degree of democracy exerts a positive 
influence on the declared support to the market. This result contradicts the conjecture 
discussed in introduction, according to which democracy might be an obstacle to reform. 
However, our conclusion is limited by the fact that we are unable to discuss how such stated 
preferences translate into voting behaviour.  
As a robustness check, we have run the same regression as that of column 4 of Table 21 
within each frontier-zone. The positive effect of democratic institutions on the support for the 
market proves particularly strong and significant at borders that are well integrated both 
culturally and economically (see Table A6 in the Annex for the quality of market integration 
at frontier-zones). This is notably the case for the Moldova-Romania frontier or the Estonia-
Latvia frontier. The effect is also strong for the Belarus-Lithuania, Belarus-Poland and 
Ukraine-Russia frontier-zones, all formerly part of the Polish Empire and--- currently highly 
integrated.  
The effect is globally well respected except for most Hungarian frontiersy and the , 
Bulgarian-Romanian frontier, Croatia-Serbia  frontier and Polandish-Ukrainiae frontier-
zonesian frontier.  The unexpectedUnexpected results for Hungary mayare certainly be  
explained by the difficult situation of the country, whichin summer 2006 , at the time of the 
LITS survey, was going through a sharp political confidence crisis after the diffusion by the 
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media of a broadcast of a the president Prime Minister trying to bribe a deputy. The Prime 
Minister being one of the main pro-market reformist advocates, the confidence crisis that 
affected him certainly contaminated attitudes towards the economic system and the virtues of 
a market democracy as a whole. Concerning the Bulgaria-Romanian frontier, the fact that the 
development of democracy in the two countries is very close, as shown by the identical 
ranking of these countries by other democracy indexesindices, like Polity IV (CIDCM, 2006) 
(see appendix) might explain why the sign of the coefficient of “More ‘more 
Ddedemocraticy”’ at the frontier between the two countries is reversed. The same reason may 
explain why many coefficients are insignificant at the borders of other countries that 
experience similar level of democracy, such as the Czech Republic and Poland (which obtain 
the same ratings both by both Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2006b) and Polity IV 
(CIDCM, 2006)), Bulgaria and Macedonia or Bosnia and Croatia. Other results are impaired 
by the fact that economic integration may be only partial at some borders, such as s of the 
frontier between Croatia and Serbia, where, heavy restrictions were lifted only in 2003.  
We verified that our results do not hold when the frontiers that were excluded from our 
sample for being closed or severely restricted are considered. For instance, the coefficient 
inside the  Armenia-Azerbaijan border zone is -0.070 (0.128); it is of -0.3283 (0.207) in the 
Kazak-Uzbek frontier-zone; of -0.097* (0.051) in the Kyrgyz-Uzbek and of 0.004 (0.696) in 
the Moldova-Ukraine zone. Considering all the closed border-zones together (and controlling 
for border-zones dummies), the coefficient on the freedom house democracy index is 0.039 
(0.053) in the regression of the support to the market. Hence the relation is not significant in 
closed frontier-zones, which is consistent with our interpretation of regional integration. 
In order to go one step further in the attempt to control for “cultural” omitted factors, we now 
estimate equation (1’’) within various sub-samples of frontier-zones belonging to historically 
integrated regions. Table 3 presents the regressions by “cultural zones” as defined in section 
3.2. Market development still hasexerts a positive and significant effect on the demand for 
democracy among countries of the former Ottoman Empire, countries of the former 
Yugoslavia, countries of the former Polish Empire and countries of the CIS, as well as among 
the subset of Central Asia.  
The effect is particularly strong in countries that have experienced a strong degree of 
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integration in the past18, such as the USSR, and a fortiori the CIS and Central Asia, where, in 
addition, today’s frontiers are often arbitrary. The effect is also significant in the former 
Yugoslavia and the Polish Empire. By contrast, it is not significant for the countries of the 
former Austro-Hungarian Empire. A possible interpretation is that the relation between 
democratic institutions and the support for the market is particularly strong for less developed 
countries. Another possible interpretation is that the countries of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire are too close in terms of democratic development for the effect to be 
sizeable.  
 
                                                 
18 As these countries have shared a common experience of a planned economy; it would be farfetched to suspect 
some reverse causality running from people’s current attitudes towards the market to the current degree of 
democracy. 
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Table 3. Democracy and Support to the Mmarket within each Ccultural Aareas 
dprobit Estimates of Support to the Market 
 -1 -2 -3 -6 -4 -5 -7 
 Austro 
Hungarian 
Ottoman Yugoslavia Polish 
Empire 
CIS Central 
Asia 
USSR 
        
Democracy index 0.031 0.137 0.068** 0.0295** 0.046*** 0.231*** 0.034*** 
 [0.021] [0.129] [0.026] [0.012] [0.013] [0.043] [0.010] 
        
Observations 1656 1920 2134 1734 2354 740 2994 
Log likelihood -1022 -1277 -1373 -1064 -1458 -443 -2008 
Pseudo R2   0.072 0.032 0.041 0.094 0.081 0.117 0.073 
Controls: income categories, age categories, gender, occupation categories, self employed, education.  
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on frontier zones.   
The Austro Hungarian zone comprises Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The 
Ottoman zone comprises Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Yugoslavian 
zone comprises Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The Commonwealth of 
Independent states (CIS) consists of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The former USSR comprises all of the CIS, plus 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The 
Polish Empire zone comprises Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, the Russian Federation (western borders). 
EU zone comprises Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  
 
5.2.As a robustness check, The positive and significant link identified between democracy 
and demand for the market seems is also consistent when using other indicators of support for 
the market. Regressions for the support to the market depending on respective democracy 
levels across borders were also performedwe also test different indicators of democracy and 
different country rankings (see the Annex). The result that the development of democracy 
positively and significantly influences the demand for the market is preserved in the 
aggregate regression using the Freedom of the World (Freedom House, 2006b) or BTI 
indicators (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005). 
 
Results at the frontier level are less conclusive, probably because 
these indices are less focused on formal democratic institutions. 
5.2.  
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5.3.Market liberalization does not raise the support for democracy 
We now address the symmetric question whether more democracy comforts the support for 
market liberalization comforts the support for democracy. We need to make sure that the 
attitude toward democracy that is we elicitobserved is not caused by the degree of 
democratization already reached in the country of the respondent. Hence, we need to find 
some groups of citizens which sharewho experience a common political eenvironment with 
experience different degrees of market liberalization.  
As explained in section 2, we rely on the widely publicized evidence that there are wide 
regional differences within the countries of the former Soviet block and Eastern and Southern 
Europe (e.g. etc.EBRD, 2006, p. 12). We build 2 an index of market advance at the regional 
level, which is based on the regional market structure (size and type of firms).   
Table 44 shows the regressions of the support to democracy on indices of regional market 
development. Because an immediate thought is that the impact of market development on 
attitudes towards democracy could be driven by the metropolitan regions in which the market 
liberalization is well in advance of other regions, and where people are also supposedlikely to 
have different political attitudes, we include a control for the type of area (urban-
metropolitan/urban/rural) in all regressions. We checked that the results are essentially 
unchanged when these controls are not performed and when metropolitan regions are dropped 
from the sample.  
Columns 1 to 3 present the regression of individual preferences for the political regime on our 
index of market development across all regions of a given country. Columns 4 to 6 present an 
alternative specification where we restrict the sample to open frontiers, and measure the 
effect of market development in the various frontier zones of a country. Lastly, columns 7 to 
9 display the result of a third specification where the degree of market development of a 
frontier-zone j is proxied by the degree of market development of the adjacent region k across 
the frontier (cf section 3.2). As explained in section 3.2, the two latter specifications are 
useful in order to avoid the risk that the observed relationship between market development 
and support to democracy is due to reverse causality.  
Columns 1, 4 and 7 analyze the determinants of the probability to declare that “democracy is 
preferable to any other form of political system”. Surprisingly, the index of market 
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development has no impact on this variable, in any of the specifications. Identically, the 
probability of choosing the modality “for people like me, it does not matter whether a 
government is democratic or authoritarian” (columns 3, 6 and 9) does not depend on the 
index of market development.  
Columns 2, 5 and 8 analyze the determinants of the probability to declare that “under some 
circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one”. Here, 
market development has a negative and significant effect when the sample is restricted to 
frontier zones of a given country. Hence, conditionally on living in a frontier zone, living 
close to a country where the market is more advanced and benefiting from this market 
development thanks to cross border market integration reduces individual support for 
authoritarian regime. However, this effect is not significant when all regions of the country 
are considered (columns 2.5 and 8).  
Market liberalization thus does not appear to reinforce democratic values. Other effects 
indicate that the the richer, better educated, younger, self- employed people and surprisingly, 
farmers and farm-workers, are more supportive of democracy. On the contrary, the poor, 
those who have not completed compulsory education and women are less supportive of 
democracy and more likely to declare that the political system does not matter for them.  
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Table 44. Support to Ddemocracy and Regional Iindices of Mmarket Lliberalization 
 
dprobit Eestimates of Ssupport to Ddemocracy/Authoritarianism 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 
 Whole sample Only frontier-zones Only frontier-zones 
          
 Democracy 
preferable 
Authoritarian 
government 
preferable 
Does not 
matter 
Democracy 
preferable 
Authoritarian 
government 
preferable 
Does not 
matter 
Democracy 
preferable 
Authoritarian 
government 
preferable 
Does not 
matter 
          
Industrial index of region -0.014 -0.001 0.012       
 [0.030] [0.019] [0.029]       
Industrial index frontier-    -0.032 -0.183*** 0.16    
zone_j    [0.106] [0.058] [0.110]    
          
Industrial index frontier-       0.015 -0.115** 0.068 
zone _k       [0.108] [0.054] [0.102] 
          
Adult (35-19) -0.024** 0.017** 0.006 -0.035** 0.022* 0.012 -0.034** 0.022 0.011 
 [0.011] [0.008] [0.007] [0.015] [0.013] [0.019] [0.016] [0.014] [0.021] 
Mid-age (50-65) -0.028* 0.020** 0.007 -0.015 0.011 0.003 -0.017 0.008 0.009 
 [0.016] [0.010] [0.009] [0.025] [0.016] [0.024] [0.027] [0.016] [0.027] 
Old (>65) -0.058*** 0.026* 0.025* -0.073** 0.008 0.053* -0.090** 0.006 0.075** 
 [0.022] [0.014] [0.013] [0.037] [0.021] [0.030] [0.041] [0.020] [0.031] 
Poor -0.056*** 0 0.052*** -0.075*** 0.014 0.057*** -0.078*** 0.015 0.058*** 
 [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.017] [0.012] [0.015] [0.018] [0.012] [0.014] 
Rich 0.028*** -0.004 -0.026*** 0.035* -0.005 -0.029* 0.033* -0.004 -0.029* 
 [0.009] [0.006] [0.007] [0.019] [0.013] [0.015] [0.020] [0.014] [0.016] 
Male  0.037*** 0.003 -0.039*** 0.027* 0.006 -0.031** 0.023 0.008 -0.029* 
 [0.008] [0.005] [0.007] [0.015] [0.011] [0.015] [0.015] [0.012] [0.016] 
Compulsory education 0.043** 0.032** -0.052*** 0.044 0.056** -0.069** 0.018 0.041 -0.04 
 [0.018] [0.016] [0.011] [0.032] [0.027] [0.033] [0.038] [0.026] [0.037] 
Secondary education 0.104*** 0.043*** -0.112*** 0.101** 0.084*** -0.136*** 0.069 0.072*** -0.106*** 
 34 
 [0.020] [0.015] [0.013] [0.042] [0.023] [0.037] [0.047] [0.022] [0.040] 
Professional education 0.117*** 0.049*** -0.129*** 0.125*** 0.085*** -0.161*** 0.094** 0.074*** -0.130*** 
 [0.017] [0.015] [0.014] [0.036] [0.024] [0.034] [0.041] [0.023] [0.034] 
University education 0.186*** 0.056*** -0.191*** 0.193*** 0.109*** -0.222*** 0.161*** 0.109*** -0.207*** 
 [0.018] [0.014] [0.011] [0.040] [0.030] [0.025] [0.044] [0.027] [0.028] 
Post graduate education 0.252*** 0.015 -0.204*** 0.169*** 0.142** -0.200*** 0.140** 0.151** -0.200*** 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.012] [0.060] [0.066] [0.032] [0.062] [0.062] [0.039] 
Unemployed 0.021 -0.015 -0.004 0.033 -0.034* 0.008 0.008 -0.016 0.011 
 [0.018] [0.013] [0.015] [0.032] [0.019] [0.023] [0.029] [0.019] [0.021] 
Self employed 0.023 -0.014 -0.009 0.03 -0.025 -0.005 0.002 -0.02 0.016 
 [0.022] [0.014] [0.015] [0.027] [0.022] [0.025] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] 
White collar worker 0.089*** -0.014 -0.079*** 0.081*** -0.008 -0.073*** 0.066** 0.006 -0.074*** 
 [0.013] [0.010] [0.012] [0.026] [0.020] [0.024] [0.026] [0.022] [0.026] 
Blue collar worker 0.029* -0.012 -0.014 0.035 -0.008 -0.022 0.024 -0.002 -0.018 
 [0.016] [0.012] [0.015] [0.029] [0.022] [0.031] [0.032] [0.021] [0.035] 
Service worker 0.053*** -0.008 -0.043*** 0.086*** -0.042** -0.038 0.069*** -0.031* -0.034 
 [0.014] [0.010] [0.013] [0.028] [0.019] [0.026] [0.026] [0.017] [0.028] 
Farmer, farm worker 0.060*** -0.004 -0.051*** 0.069*** 0.016 -0.082*** 0.068** 0.029 -0.089*** 
 [0.017] [0.013] [0.017] [0.026] [0.024] [0.023] [0.033] [0.028] [0.028] 
Pensioner -0.002 -0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 -0.014 -0.004 0.023 -0.015 
 [0.018] [0.010] [0.019] [0.034] [0.017] [0.030] [0.037] [0.016] [0.033] 
Student 0.128*** -0.038*** -0.085*** 0.088 -0.054 -0.023 0.071 -0.039 -0.024 
 [0.028] [0.013] [0.021] [0.065] [0.039] [0.038] [0.067] [0.042] [0.042] 
Housewife 0.039** -0.034** -0.005 0.022 -0.031 0.013 -0.004 -0.014 0.02 
 [0.018] [0.013] [0.019] [0.035] [0.025] [0.030] [0.035] [0.026] [0.032] 
Observations 28909 28909 28955 7032 7032 7041 6274 6274 6281 
log likelihood -18624.11 -12203.71 -15662.88 -4511.66 -3055.29 -3848.54 -4051.73 -2682.95 -3491.07 
Pseudo R2 0.0557 0.0297 0.0711 0.0685 0.0496 0.0814 0.0625 0.0456 0.0746 
 
 
 
Omitted category: rural 
Controls: urban/rural or metropole area for columns 1 to 3. Omitted categories: young (17 to 34 years old), average income group, occupation in army, employees, lowest 
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education. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.   
The industrial index is constructed at the regional level. Industrial index j is the index of market development of the zone where the respondent lives. Industrial index k 
measures the market development of the adjacent frontier-zone  
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As the estimates of Table 4 are based on regional variations, it may seem confusing to pool 
the data of the various countries of the sample together. Hence, we run the same estimation of 
the support to democracy within each country of the survey. Country-wise regressions 
corroborate this the finding that the support to democracy only does not increase with the 
industrial development indicator. Finally, we estimate the support to democracy within each 
zone of deeper regional and cultural integration (Tables 5.a and 5.b). Table 5.a displays the 
regressions on the entire sample; the industrial index measures the score of market 
development at the regional level. Table 5.b shows the regression on the sub-sample of 
frontier-zones. The industrial index measures the sore of market development of the adjacent 
frontier-zone. 
Essentially, regional market development again appears to exert no impact on the support to 
democracy. The industrial index of market development is only significant for the regions of 
the former Austro-Hungarian Empire; by contrast, the impact of the index is significantly 
negative in regions of Central Asia. Hence, the link between market development and 
preferences for democracy only appears in countries that are more affluent and face a higher 
degree of actual democracy.  
Lindblom (1995) provides a possible interpretation of these findings. He defines markets and 
democracy as two distinct methods of popular controls over the elites. The former aims at 
outcomes (resources allocation) but gives no control over the processes that generate 
outcomes; symmetrically, the latter provides popular control over processes. In this 
framework, an interpretation of our findings is that the need to control processes becomes 
more pressing in situations where people have already secured the control over outcomes. It 
may also be the case that the relation is non linear, i.e. for people to care about processes, 
they need to have already reached a certain degree of empowerment. This would explain why 
the demand for democracy is stronger in societies that are already more advanced in terms of 
both market liberalization and democratization. 
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Table 5.a4. Support to Ddemocracy and Regional Iindices of Mmarket Lliberalization 
  
dprobit Eestimates of Ssupport to Ddemocracy 
Full sample 
 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 
 Austro 
Hungarian 
Ottoman Yugoslavia CIS Central 
Asia 
Polish 
Empire 
USSR EU 
 
         
Industrial index 0.109** -0.011 0.045 -0.077 -0.205 -0.002 -0.080** 0.032 
 [0.050] [0.042] [0.044] [0.048] [0.096] [0.045] [0.034] [0.045] 
         
Observations 4973 7975 5971 10972 4000 4972 13952 9964 
Log likelihood -3106 -5138 -3827 -7167 -2547 -3253 -9142 -6394 
Pseudo R2   0.062 0.062 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.056 0.050 0.059 
Cont
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Table 5b4. Support to Ddemocracy and Regional Iindices of Mmarket Lliberalization 
 
dprobit Eestimates of Ssupport to Ddemocracy  
Sub-sample of Frontier-Zones 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 
 Austro 
Hungarian 
Ottoman Yugoslavia CIS Central 
Asia 
Polish 
Empire 
USSR EU 
 
         
Industrial index  0.123* -0.036 0.125 0.019 -0.123 -0.018 -0.035 -0.009 
frontier-zone_k [0.075] [0.085] [0.082] [0.133] [0.252] [0.087] [0.092] [0.073] 
         
Observations 1656 1940 2134 3794 1859 1794 4414 2322 
Log likelihood -1051 -1250 -1365 -2452 -1188 -1161 -2869 -1472 
Pseudo R2   0.066 0.094 0.072 0.064 0.057 0.067 0.058 0.064 
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June.rols: income, age categories, education categories, gender, occupation categories, country dummies.  
The industrial index measures the level of market development of the adjacent frontier-zone k , when the respondent lives in 
frontier-zone j. 
 
 
Finally, a 
 
 
s a robustness check, we use alternative indicators of both the explained variable (support to 
democracy) and the explanatory variable (market development). First, we build an index of 
adhesion to for democratic principles based on questions of the LIT Survey. cy for 
respondentsThis index is based on the following question:  
 
Q3.12. To what extent do you agree that the following are important for your country:  
Scale: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree, 
Difficult to say 
- Free and fair elections. 
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- Law and order.  
- Freedom of speech. 
- Peace and stability 
- A press that is independent from the government. 
- A strong political opposition 
- A courts system that defends individual rights against abuse by the state. 
- A courts system that treats all citizens equally, rather than favoring some over others. 
- Protection of minority rights (religious, ethnics, etc…) 
- Freedom to travel abroad 
The “value of democracy” index sums the number of times a person declares to “agree” or 
“strongly agree” that the items listed in the above table are important. The index varies from 
0 to 9, with an average of 4,5.  
Table 6 shows the ordered probit regression of the “value of democracy” index. Column one 
displays the regression on the entire sample; the industrial index measures the score of market 
development at the regional level. Column 2 shows the regression on the sub-sample of 
frontier-zones. The industrial index measures the sore of market development of the adjacent 
frontier-zone. 
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Table 68. The Vvalue of Ddemocracy and Regional Iindices of Mmarket Ddevelopment 
 
Ordered Pprobit Rregressions of the Sscore of Ddeclared Iimportance of Ddemocracy 
 
 -1 -2 
 Entire sample 
(industrial index of zone j) 
Only frontier-zones 
(industrial index of adjacent zone k) 
   
Industrial index 0.038 -0.3 
 [0.090] [0.232] 
Observations 27955 6281 
Log likelihood -61759 -13689 
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.027 
Controls: type of area (rural, urban or metropolitan), income, age categories, education categories, gender, 
occupation categories, country dummies. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level 
Column 1: whole sample. Industrial index of the region j of the respondent.  
Column 2: only frontier-zones. Industrial index of the adjacent frontier zone k when respondent live in 
region j. 
  
 
Again regional market indices do not seem to influence the importance that citizens attach to 
democracy. The impact even seems to be significantly negative in regions of the CIS and of 
the former Polish Empire. 
Of course, the indices of market development that we use may be misconstrued 
and it is possible that better measures of market liberalization do would be found 
to influence the support to democracy. Alternative We regret that indices of good 
candidates to approximate the market structure include indices of industrial 
concentration are not available at the regional level for the whole set of countries 
in the sample19 for instance. 
 As an alternative to the index of industrial development, we use an indicator of relative 
wealth. We calculate the average aggregate regional income based on the real expenditures 
                                                 
19 In our view, indices of this type would be best suited, if they were available, than some often used indicators 
based on governance, the protection of legal rights, the protection of minority shareholders or indices of price 
liberalization. The latter have two important drawbacks: first they are only available at the national level and 
second, they often reflect the progress of the rule of law, i.e. of democracy itself, rather than that of the freedom 
of transactions on the market. 
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declared by the households of the survey, relative to the national average20. This is based on 
the idea that aggregate income is an outcome of market development. Again, as shown by 
Table 7, this indicator does not exert any significant impact on the attitudes to democracy or 
authoritarian regimes21.  
 
Table7. Support to democracy and relative regional income 
dprobit Eestimates of Ssupport to Ddemocracy 
 -1 -2 -3 
 Democracy 
preferable 
Authoritarian 
government 
preferable 
Does not matter 
    
Regional level of expenditure 0.021 -0.002 -0.018 
 [0.043] [0.031] [0.028] 
    
Observations 27960 27960 27995 
Log likelihood -18089 -11981 -15212 
Pseudo R2  0.055 0.027 0.073 
Controls: income, age categories, education categories, gender, occupation categories, country dummies. 
The industrial index is constructed as the average regional real level of expenditure. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.  
 
In summary, the degree of market development does not seem to have a sizable impact on the 
political support to democracy, or on the rejection of authoritarian regimes. In contradiction 
with current priors, developing market institutions is not a guarantee or a sufficient condition 
of the subsequent emergence of democracy.  
 
In our view, it is more advisable to stick useto such indices rather than on some usual indicators based on 
governance, protection of legal rights, the protection of minority shareholders or indices of price liberalization 
for instance. The latter have two important drawbacks: first they are only available at the national level and, 
second, they often reflect the progress of the rule of law, i.e. of democracy, rather than that of the free initiatives 
of individuals on the market. 
                                                 
20 Household expenditures were adjusted for household size using the modified OECD equivalence scale.  
21 Here we do not use frontier-zones integration as there is no point in supposing that inhabitants of a given 
region experience the level of wealth of neighbour regions.   
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6. Follow up 
For the analysis of question 1, we need an index of the 
development of democracy in each country. We have so far 
used the Freedom House index, but it may be useful to 
give an in-house and up-to-date index, especially 
considering last years’ numerous evens in Central Europe 
(difficulties and troubles in Hungary , Poland and the 
Czech Republic for example) and in the CIS. Indeed, these 
events show in the data, and using not up to date indexes 
lead to some confusion in the results.  
Conclusion 
The main result of this paper is that, in Transition countries, contrary to leading conjectures, 
democracy appears to generate some popular support for the market, while economic 
liberalization does not clearly raise the support for democracy. These observations are 
consistent with the empirical observation that market economies can live without democracy, 
whereas there is no historical evidence of a democratic society without a market economy. 
To be sure, these results only suggest that democracy raises the subjective support to the 
market. This does not mean that democracy is not likely to complicate the task of reformers, 
with the risk of impeding market liberalization. The relation running from democracy to the 
support to the market is particularly strong in countries of the CIS, Central Asia and South 
Eastern Europe, as opposed to other countries of the European Union (e.g. Central Europe). 
Hence, the link seems to be particularly relevant for “developing” countries, i.e. countries 
which are still in an earlier stage of democratic development. 
Concerning the reverse relation, our results cast doubt on the idea that democracy needs 
naturally emerge as a by-product of capitalism, particularly in less developed countries. 
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modernisation of the industrial structure of the economy seems to have no impacThe data do 
not support the idea that market liberalization as such is sufficient to trigger the demand for 
democracy; identically, citizens of countries with less developed markets do not appear to be 
less supportive of democracy. Hence, one cannot advocate the preferences of citizens to 
postpone the construction of democratic institutions. 
In summary, our data do not support a widespread view concerning the optimal sequencing of 
reforms for developing countries: it seems that building democratic institutions can play as an 
ingredient in favor of market liberalization, whereas early market development is no 
guarantee of a later popular support to democracy.  
 
 
Our results cast doubts on the idea that democracy would emerge naturally as a by-product of 
capitalism. Even if the demand for democracy increases with income, not too much should be 
expected from market development as such. It seems thus not to be enough to push for market 
liberalisation and expect subsequent natural development of democracy.  
 
Our findings also seem to oppose some arguments of the political economy of reform, 
according to which democracy would be an obstacle to reform and economic liberalisation. 
However, a point of caution here is that we only analyse subjective demand, and it would be 
farfetched to infer anything from stated preferences to voting behaviour. Even if underlying 
preferences are in favour of general reform and liberalisation, people might still react to short 
term losses from reforms by outvoting pro-market forces.   
Questions remain open in what regards the nature of the links identified in this paper. Why 
and how does the development of political freedoms generate a stronger support for the 
market? This result is consistent with Gibson (1996), and Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), 
who argue in favour of the alternative theory to modernisation that defends that democracy 
not instrumental but part of value system that contaminates attitudes to the market. The same 
reasoning argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union was mainly driven by political motives 
and desire for political freedom.  However, the clear underlying value mechanism remains 
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unclear. A tentative explanation, in light with Lundblom (1995) relies in the complementarity 
between democracy and market as methods of popular control over elites. Lundblom (1995) 
argues that market popular controls aim mainly at results, while democratic popular controls 
aim largely at processes. The former needs the latter. A functioning market needs a system of 
checks and balances, anti-monopoly regulation, equality between atomised market players, in 
other words without political controls that limits the powers of market elites. When these do 
not exist, free market degenerates and with it vanishes the market power of non-elites and 
their support for the market.  
The other important question raised by this paper is: Why does financial rather than industrial 
sector development reinforce the support for political freedom? According to political 
economy models such as Verdier and Ades (1996), the underlying mechanism could be that 
the development of financial instruments allows to lift the financial constraints that impede 
political participation, as this is a costly activity. However, this is not a fully satisfactory 
answer, because, as mentioned above, we do not analyse active political participation, but 
rather preferences, and such models do not offer an explanation as to why such a preference 
shift would occur.  
 
 7. Bibliography 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001), “The Colonial Origins 
of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 91, No. 5, pp. 1369-1401.  
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson and Pierre Yared (2004a), “From 
Education to Democracy?”, American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon. Johnson, James A. Robinson and Pierre Yared (2004b), 
“Income and Democracy”, mimeo, MIT. 
Alesina, Alberto and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (2005), “Good bye Lenin (or not?): The 
Effect of Communism on People’s Preferences”, Harvard Institute of Economic Research 
Discussion Paper N°2076. 
Aslund, Anders, Peter Boone and Simon Johnson (2001), “Escaping the Under Reform 
Trap”, IMF Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, vol. 48(4).  
Babetskii, Ian, Oxana Koukhartcouk and Martin Raiser (2003), “How Deep is your 
Trade?”, EBRD working paper no. 83.  
 50
Barro, Robert (1997), Determinants of Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1997.  
Berkowitz, Daniel and John E. Jackson (2005), "The Evolution of an Economic and 
Political Middle Class in Transition Countries", Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 2005, Washington, DC. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2005), Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006: Political 
Management in International Comparison, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/fileadmin/pdf/BTI_2006_Brosch_re_GB.pdf 
Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2000), “A Model of Cultural Transmission, Voting 
and Political Ideology”, European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pp. 5-
29.  
Broadman, Harry (2005), “From Disintegration to Reintegration: Europe and Central Asia 
in International Trade”, World Bank, mimeo.  
Brym Robert J. (1996), “Re-evaluating Mass Support for political and Economic Change 
in Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp. 751-765.  
Burkhart, Ross E. and Michael S. Lewis-Beck (1994), “Comparative Democracy: The 
Economic Development Thesis”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 
903-910.  
Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) (2006), Polity 
IV: Political Regimes  Characteristics and Transition: 1800-2004, University of Maryland.  
Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold and Donald P. Green (1990), “American Identity and the 
Politics of Ethnic Change”, Journal of Politics Vol. 52, pp. 1124-54.  
De Toqueville, Alexis (1839), Democracy in America, vol. 2, New York : Vintage :1945.  
Dewatripont, Mathias and Gérard Roland (1992), “The Virtues of Gradualism and 
Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy”, The Economic Journal, vol. 102(411), 
pp. 291-300. 
Djankov, Simeon and Caroline Freund (2000), “Disintegration”, CEPR Discussion 
Papers 2545.  
Earle, John S. and Zuzana Sakova (2000), “Business Start-ups or Disguised 
Unemployment? Evidence on the Character of Self-employment from Transition 
Economies”, Labor Economics, Vol 7, pp. 575–601. 
Easton, David A. (1965), A System Analysis of Political Life, New York, London, 
Sydney: John Wiley & Sons.  
EBRD Transition Report (2006), Finance in transition, Chapter 1: “Progress in 
Transition”, pp. 1-18. 
EBRD, Life in Transition: A Survey of People’s Experiences and Attitudes (2007).  
 51
Fernandez, Raquel and Alessandra Fogli (2000), “Culture: An Empirical Investigation of 
Beliefs, Work, and Fertility”, NBER Working Papers 11268, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc. 
Finifter, Ada and Ellen Mickiewicz (1992), “Redefining the Political System of the 
USSR: Mass support for Political Change”, American political Science Review, Vol. 23, pp. 
857-874.  
Freedom House (2006a), Nations in Transit 2006: Democratization from Central Europe 
to Eurasia, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.  
Freedom House (2006b), Freedom in the World 2006: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
Giavazzi F and Guido Tabellini (2005), “Economic and Political Liberalizations”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 52, 1297-1330. 
Gibson, James L. (1996), “Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections 
Between Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass 
Culture of Russia and Ukraine”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 954-984.  
Godoy, Sergio and Joseph Stiglitz (2006), “Growth, Initial Conditions, Law and Speed of 
Privatization in Transition Countries: 11 Years Later”, NBER Working Papers 11992, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
Grafe, Clemens, Martin Raiser and Toshiaki Sakatsume (2005), “Beyond Borders: 
Reconsidering Regional Trade in Central Asia”, EBRD working paper No. 95.  
Guido Tabellini (2007), “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of 
Europe », IGIER working paper. 
Helliwell, John F. (1994). “Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic 
Growth”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 225-248. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer ad Robert Vishny 
(1999), “The Quality of Goverment”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, Vol. 
15, pp. 222-279.  
Leblang, David A. (1997), “Political Democracy and Economic Growth: Pooled Cross-
Sectional and Time-Series Evidence”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 
453-466. 
Lindlblom Charles E. (1995), “Market and Democracy. Obliquely”, Political Science and 
Politics, 28(4), 684-688. 
Lipset, Seymour M. (1959), “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, 
No. 1, pp. 69-105 
Lütkepohl, Helmut (1982), “Non-causality due to omitted variables”, Journal of 
 52
Econometrics, Vol. 19, Issues 2-3, pp. 367-378.  
Marx, Karl (1867), Capital, Vol. 1 A Critique of Political Economy, ed. Penguin 
Classique London, 1990. 
Mason, David S. (1995), “Attitudes Toward the Market and political Participation in the 
Postcommunist States”, Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 385-406. 
McIntosh, Mary, Martha Abele Mac Iver, Daniel G. Abele and Dina Smeltz (1994), 
“Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: 1991-1996”, Slavic Review, 
Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 483-512.  
Mill, John Stuart (1860). Considerations on Representative Government. In 
Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton. London: Dent, 
1951.  
Miller, Arthur, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger (1994), “Reassessing Mass 
Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR”, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 88, pp. 399-411.  
Miller, Arthur, William M. Reisinger (1994) and Vicki L. Hesli (1996), “Understanding 
Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: a Further Commentary on Finifter and 
Mickiewicz”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 153-166.  
Minier, Jenny A. (2001). “Is Democracy a Normal Good? Evidence from Democratic 
Movements”, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 996-1009. 
Mishler, William and Richard Rose (1994), “Support for Parliaments and Regimes in the 
Transition toward Democracy in Eastern Europe”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 
1, pp. 5-32.  
Okui, Katsuyoshi (2005), “Causality Between Political Freedom and Economic 
Freedom”, Otemon Gakui University Working Paper, Osaka.  
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2006), “Democracy and Development: The Devil 
in the Details », American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 96, 319-324. 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2007a), The Growth Effects of Democracy: Is It 
Heterogenous and How Can It Be Estimated? May 2007, forthcoming in Institutions and 
Economic Performance, edited by E. Helpman , Harvard University Press. 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2007b), “Democratic Capital: The Nexus of 
Political and Economic Change », IGIER working paper. 
Przeworski, Adam (2004), “Democracy and Economic Development”. In Edward D. 
Mansfield and Richard Sisson (eds.), The Evolution of Political Knowledge. Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press.  
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993), “Political Regimes and Economic 
Growth”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 51-69. 
 53
Rodrick Dany and Wacziarg R. (2005), “Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic 
Outcomes?” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 95, 50-56. 
Roland, Gérard (2001), “The Political Economy of Transition”, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 29-50. 
Roland, Gérard and Thierry Verdier (2003), “Law Enforcement and Transition”, 
European Economic Review, vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 669-685. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A., (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, Harper 
and Bros.  
Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V. (2000), “Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal 
Federalism, Russian Style”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 76, No. 3, pp. 337-368.  
 54
87. Annex 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix 
8.1.Figures and Tables 
Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1.  
Support for Democracy and Markets
(% of respondents)
Serbia
Romania Montenegro
Albania
FYROM Bosnia
Bulgaria Croatia
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Mongolia
Moldova
Armenia
Russia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Georgia
Kyrgyz Rep
Ukraina
Slovenia
Slovak RepCzech Rep
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Support for Democracy
Support for Markets
SEE CIS+M CEB  
 
Table A10. Descriptive Statistics 
 55
Variable Mean Std. dev.
favmarket 1 if resp. prefers market economy to other form of economic system 0.43 0.50
lowpricefood 1 if resp. favours strong state intervention in guaranteeing low prices for food 0.74 0.44
garempl 1 if resp. favours strong state intervention in guaranteeing employment 0.79 0.41
ownlc 1 if resp. favours state ownership of large companie 0.55 0.50
state index of lowpricefood + garempl + ownlc (min:1; max:3) 2.09 1.03
old more than 65 years old 0.16 0.37
midage between 50 and 65 years old 0.24 0.43
adult between 35 and 50  years old 0.31 0.46
genderB 1 if male 0.48 0.50
unemp actively looking for a job, waiting for an answer or find no job available 0.09 0.29
whnow White collar worker 0.17 0.38
blnow Blue collar worker 0.18 0.38
servnow work in services 0.12 0.32
ffarmworker farmer or farmworker 0.05 0.22
pensioner 0.21 0.41
student 0.03 0.16
housewife 0.06 0.25
outlab out of the labour force 0.05 0.22
selfemp work as self employed at their main job (regardless occupation) 0.08 0.28
favdemoc 1 if respendent prefers democracy to other form of political system 0.57 0.49
favautho 1 if respendent prefers authoritarian system 0.16 0.37
dntmatter 1 if resp. declare that pol. system doesn't matter 0.27 0.44
laborindex reg. index, share of SMEs, private, post-1989 created enterprises. Min: 1; Max:5 2.39 1.05
financeindex reg. index, dev'ment of financial services (bank account, credit car). Min: 1 Max: 2 0.67 0.85
totalindex1 rsum laborindex financial index. Min: 0; max: 7 1.70 1.79
totalindex2 laborindex+financeindex. Min:0; Max:7 3.33 1.42
trust_pres trust in the presidency. Min: 1 (complete distruct; Max: 5: complete trust) 0.48 0.50
trust_gov trust in the government. Min: 1; Max: 5 0.33 0.47
trust_courts trust in courts. Min: 1; Max: 5 0.32 0.47
trust_polp~t trust in pol. parties. Min: 1; Max: 5 0.19 0.39
trust_police trust in police.Min: 1; Max: 5 0.41 0.49
1.93 2.06
1.93 2.06
imp_freel importance of free and fair elections. Min: 1; Max 5 0.89 0.32
imp_laword imp. of law and order. Min: 1; Max 5 0.59 0.49
imp_freesp imp. of freedom of speech. Min: 1; Max 5 0.51 0.50
imp_peace imp. of peace and stability. Min: 1; Max 5 0.65 0.48
imp_indeprs imp. of press independence. Min: 1; Max 5 0.44 0.50
imp_polopp imp. of political opposition. Min: 1; Max 5 0.39 0.49
imp_courtin imp. of courts to defend ind. rights againts abuse by state. Min: 1; Max 5 0.55 0.50
imp_courteq imp. of equal treatment of citizens in courts. Min: 1; Max 5 0.60 0.49
imp_minor imp. of minority rights protection. Min: 1; Max 5 0.42 0.49
imp_freeab imp. of freedom to travel abroad. Min: 1; Max 5 0.53 0.50
5.38 3.59
trust global index (sum) of trust in above institutions. Min: 0(trust in none); Max: 6 (trust in all)
impdemo global index (sum) of importance of above democratic institutions. Min: 0(none is 
important); Max: 10 (all are very important)
 
Variable   Mean Std. dev. 
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Market preferable 
Planned economy is 
preferable 
1 if resp. prefers market economy to other form of economic system 
1 if resp. prefers planned economy under certain circumstances 
0.43 
0.26 
0.50 
0.44 
Does not matter_eco 
 
Democracy preferable 
Authoritarian reg. 
preferable  
Does not matter_pol 
 
 
1 if resp. answers “for people like me it does not matter” whether the economy is 
organized as a market economy or as a planned economy 
1 if resp. prefers democracy to other form of political system 
1 if resp. prefers authoritarian regime under certain circumstances 
 
1 if resp. answers “for people like me it does not matter” whether a government is 
democratic or authoritarian 
0.31 
 
0.57 
0.16 
 
0.27 
 
0.46 
 
0.49 
0.37 
 
0.37 
old more than 65 years old 0.16 0.37 
Mid-age between 50 and 65 years old 0.24 0.43 
Adult between 35 and 50  years old 0.31 0.46 
genderB 1 if male  0.48 0.50 
      
unemployed actively looking for a job. waiting for an answer or find no job available 0.09 0.29 
White collar 
workerwhnow 
White collar worker 0.17 0.38 
Blue collar 
workerblnow 
Blue collar worker 0.18 0.38 
Service worker 
servnow 
work in services 0.12 0.32 
Farmer or farm 
workerffarmworker 
farmer or farmworker 0.05 0.22 
Ppensioner  0.21 0.41 
Sstudent  0.03 0.16 
Hhousewife  0.06 0.25 
out of the labor 
forceoutlab 
out of the labour force 0.05 0.22 
self employedselfemp work as self employed at their main job (regardless occupation) 0.08 0.28 
      
Support favdemocracy 1 if respondent prefers democracy to other form of political system 0.57 0.49 
favauthoAuthoritarian  1 if respondent prefers authoritarian system  0.16 0.37 
dntmatterDoes not 
matter 
1 if respondent declares that political system doesn't matter 0.27 0.44 
laborindexIndustrial 
index 
regional. index. share of SMEs. private. post-1989 created enterprises. Min: 1; Max:5 2.39 1.05 
      
imp_freel importance of free and fair elections. Min: 1; Max 5 0.89 0.32 
imp_laword imp. of law and order. Min: 1; Max 5 0.59 0.49 
imp_freesp imp. of freedom of speech. Min: 1; Max 5 0.51 0.50 
imp_peace imp. of peace and stability. Min: 1; Max 5 0.65 0.48 
imp_indeprs imp. of press independence. Min: 1; Max 5 0.44 0.50 
imp_polopp imp. of political opposition. Min: 1; Max 5 0.39 0.49 
imp_courtin imp. of courts to defend ind. rights against abuse by state. Min: 1; Max 5 0.55 0.50 
imp_courteq imp. of equal treatment of citizens in courts. Min: 1; Max 5 0.60 0.49 
imp_minor imp. of minority rights protection. Min: 1; Max 5 0.42 0.49 
imp_freeab imp. of freedom to travel abroad. Min: 1; Max 5 0.53 0.50 
impdemo global index (sum) of importance of above democratic institutions. Min: 0(none is 
important); Max: 10 (all are very important) 
5.38 3.59 
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Table A2: Attitudes towards the Market and Democracy in frontier zones of adjacent 
countries, ranked by democracy level 
 Country i Country j  Country i  Country j 
 Market 
preferable 
Market 
preferable 
Democracy 
preferable 
Democracy 
Preferable 
 
Estonia> Russia 0.56 0.33 0.68 0.48 
Estonia >Latvia 0.46 0.17 0.50 0.56 
Russia > Belarus 0.32 0.48 0.38 0.57 
Ukraine>Russia 0.50 0.22 0.61 0.31 
Russia>Kazakhstan 0.28 0.35 0.42 0.52 
Latvia> Lithuania 0.32 0.50 0.51 0.59 
Lithuania > Belarus 0.55 0.33 0.58 0.61 
Albania> Montenegro 0.71 0.51 0.74 0.74 
Georgia>Armenia 0.45 0.25 0.62 0.60 
turkey>Armenia 0.27 0.20 1.00 0.50 
Georgia > Azerbaijan 0.35 0.39 0.50 0.44 
Poland>Belarus 0.42 0.43 0.60 0.12 
Ukraine>Belarus 0.55 0.41 0.58 0.49 
Poland > Ukraine 0.13 0.46 0.47 0.51 
Slovak>Poland 0.27 0.33 0.59 0.46 
Romania>Ukraine  0.74 0.82 0.82 0.87 
Slovak Rep.>Ukraine 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.51 
Croatia>Bosnia 0.34 0.29 0.43 0.49 
Slovenia>Croatia 0.55 0.40 0.70 0.58 
Serbia >Macedonia 0.90 0.27 0.92 0.40 
Hungary>Serbia 0.57 0.38 0.80 0.42 
Bulgaria> Macedonia 0.25 0.54 0.43 0.56 
Bulgaria>Romania  0.25 0.32 0.32 0.42 
Romania > Moldova 0.59 0.41 0.68 0.62 
Romania >Serbia 0.56 0.38 0.52 0.42 
Hungary>Romania  0.69 0.69 0.75 0.75 
Hungary >Croatia 0.24 0.37 0.41 0.49 
Hungary > Romania 0.27 0.69 0.61 0.75 
Slovak Rep.>Hungary 0.58 0.37 0.73 0.65 
Slovak>Czech Rep.  0.49 0.41 0.64 0.40 
 Poland>Czech Rep 0.45 0.48 0.58 0.62 
Kyrgyzstan>Kazakhstan 0.49 0.27 0.53 0.43 
Kyrgyzstan>Tajikistan 0.70 0.35 0.75 0.48 
Symbols > or < indicate the country ranking in terms of democracy according to Freedom House Nations in 
Transit 2006.  Average score inside each zone. 
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Table A3: Attitudes Towards the Market and Democracy  
in Frontier-Zones of Selected Countries 
Democ.  BELARUS  Fronteer 
industrial 
index 
Market 
preferable 
Democ. 
preferable 
ROMANIA  Fronteer 
industrial 
index 
Market 
preferable preferable 
Belarus Poland 1.87 0.43 0.12 Romania Serbia 2.39 0.56 0.52 
Belarus Ukraine 1.89 0.41 0.49 Romania Bulgaria 2.43 0.32 0.42 
Belarus Russia 1.98 0.48 0.57 Romania Hungary 2.58 0.69 0.75 
Belarus Lithuania 2.03 0.33 0.61 Romania 
Moldova 
2.64 0.59 0.68 
CROATIA     RUSSIA     
Croatia Bosnia 2.35 0.34 0.43 Russia Mongolia 2.2 0.64 0.61 
Croatia Slovenia 2.31 0.4 0.58 Russia 
Kazakhstan 
2.26 0.28 0.42 
HUNGARY     Russia Estonia 2.33 0.33 0.48 
Hungary Slovak Rep. 2.33 0.37 0.65 Russia Poland 2.33 0.45 0.57 
Hungary Croatia 2.38 0.12 0.34 Russia Belarus 2.33 0.32 0.38 
Hungary Romania 2.48 0.27 0.61 Russia Ukraine 2.51 0.22 0.31 
Hungary Serbia 2.53 0.57 0.8 SERBIA     
LATVIA     Serbia Macedonia 2.12 0.9 0.92 
Latvia Lithuania 2.9 0.32 0.51 Serbia Romania 2.29 0.39 0.48 
Latvia Russia 2.9 0.24 0.43 Serbia Hungary 2.4 0.38 0.42 
Latvia Estonia 3.38 0.17 0.56 UKRAINE     
LITHUANIA     Ukraine Poland 2.25 0.46 0.51 
Lithuania Belarus 2.5 0.55 0.58 Ukraine Belarus 2.32 0.55 0.58 
Lithuania Latvia 2.9 0.5 0.59 Ukraine Russia 2.34 0.5 0.61 
Lithuania Russia 3.17 0.26 0.6 Ukraine Romania 2.53 0.82 0.87 
POLAND     Ukraine Slovak 
Rep. 
2.67 0.5 0.51 
Poland Belarus 1.94 0.42 0.6     
Poland Ukraine 2.26 0.13 0.47     
Poland Czech Rep. 2.43 0.45 0.58     
Poland Slovak Rep. 2.77 0.33 0.46         
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table A41. Descriptive Sstatistics by Ccountry 
Fav. demo. Fav. autho. Fav. market Fav. plan. laborindex fin. index state trust imp.demo
albania 66.1 9.4 65.15 13.14 2.30 0.35 2.18 1.95 7.23
armenia 47.01 13.6 33.22 22.19 2.32 0.08 2.54 1.01 0.64
azerbaijan 47.55 9.13 39.61 9.27 1.96 0.03 2.05 3.35 5.15
belarus 52.04 17.06 48 19.08 1.94 0.38 1.71 4.33
bosnia 61.42 19.14 34.37 38.65 2.33 0.69 2.44 1.21 6.43
bulgaria 36.79 24.72 2.61 0.59 1.83 1.31 5.89
croatia 55.28 14.12 36.32 26.78 2.37 1.54 2.20 1.29 7.41
czechrep 58.53 17.59 47.03 27.25 2.60 1.40 1.36 1.38 5.36
estonia 61.11 12.23 49.47 18.45 2.78 1.76 1.39 2.30 6.03
fyrom 46.63 18.04 33.88 28.96 2.33 0.34 2.27 1.25 5.09
georgia 58.13 11.63 38 23.04 2.28 0.14 2.34 2.61 5.73
hungary 61.68 13.45 37.31 26.29 2.53 1.13 1.85 1.97 6.17
kazakhstan 48.81 22.23 31.92 39.52 2.50 0.23 2.36 2.96 5.86
kyrgyzstan 58.92 19.11 49.75 27.68 2.25 0.02 2.23 2.08 4.35
latvia 55.97 19.59 39.11 26.16 2.75 1.28 1.93 1.50 5.99
lithuania 54.42 10.31 41.64 17.12 2.73 1.23 2.11 1.24 5.72
moldova 49.59 19.25 39.19 32.75 2.32 0.20 1.92 1.61 4.32
mongolia 69.92 19.82 71.42 16 2.22 0.41 2.20 1.90 1.79
montenegro 73.27 8.26 47.17 26.02 2.19 0.50 2.37 2.01 6.82
poland 54.19 17.49 4024 14.6 2.36 1.09 1.87 1.19 6.27
romania 50.19 26.68 45.87 26.77 2.55 0.62 1.97 1.73 5.81
russia 36.05 32.77 27.67 41.03 2.37 0.52 2.11 1.66 4.88
serbia 51.02 14 44.52 21.21 2.33 0.98 2.22 1.19 6.80
slovakrep 67.43 13.21 47.51 24.57 2.52 1.27 1.78 1.86 5.12
slovenia 66.37 8.18 49.79 18.77 2.26 1.71 1.97 1.67 6.29
tajikistan 62.74 15.87 51.35 28.18 2.21 0.02 2.38 4.40 4.26
turkey 74.93 6.04 3.7.59 32.75 2.06 0.54 2.57 3.23 7.01
ukraine 55.14 24.45 42.19 33.24 2.36 0.33 2.12 1.00 5.39
uzbekistan 68.4 12.24 43.55 38.04 2.27 0.07 2.28 4.19 3.84
 
  FavSupport 
Democracy 
(%) 
FavSupport 
Authoritarian 
(%) 
FavSupport 
Market (%) 
FavSupport 
Plan (%). 
laborindexIndustrial 
Index 
imp.demoImportance 
democracy 
Aalbania 66.1 9.4 65.15 13.14 2.30 7.23 
Aarmenia 47.01 13.6 33.22 22.19 2.32 NA 
Aazerbaijan 47.55 9.13 39.61 9.27 1.96 5.15 
Bbelarus 52.04 17.06 48 19.08 1.94 4.33 
Bbosnia 61.42 19.14 34.37 38.65 2.33 6.43 
Bbulgaria 45.90 17.74 36.79 24.72 2.61 5.89 
Ccroatia 55.28 14.12 36.32 26.78 2.37 7.41 
Cczech Rep. 58.53 17.59 47.03 27.25 2.60 5.36 
Eestonia 61.11 12.23 49.47 18.45 2.78 6.03 
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FfYR 
Macedonia 
46.63 18.04 33.88 28.96 2.33 5.09 
Ggeorgia 58.13 11.63 38 23.04 2.28 5.73 
Hhungary 61.68 13.45 37.31 26.29 2.53 6.17 
Kkazakhstan 48.81 22.23 31.92 39.52 2.50 5.86 
Kkyrgyzstan 58.92 19.11 49.75 27.68 2.25 4.35 
Llatvia 55.97 19.59 39.11 26.16 2.75 5.99 
Llithuania 54.42 10.31 41.64 17.12 2.73 5.72 
Mmoldova 49.59 19.25 39.19 32.75 2.32 4.32 
Mmongolia 69.92 19.82 71.42 16 2.22 1.79 
Mmontenegro 73.27 8.26 47.17 26.02 2.19 6.82 
Ppoland 54.19 17.49 40.24 14.6 2.36 6.27 
Rromania 50.19 26.68 45.87 26.77 2.55 5.81 
Rrussia 36.05 32.77 27.67 41.03 2.37 4.88 
Sserbia 51.02 14 44.52 21.21 2.33 6.80 
Sslovak Rep. 67.43 13.21 47.51 24.57 2.52 5.12 
Sslovenia 66.37 8.18 49.79 18.77 2.26 6.29 
Ttajikistan 62.74 15.87 51.35 28.18 2.21 4.26 
Tturkey 74.93 6.04 37.59 32.75 2.06 7.01 
Uukraine 55.14 24.45 42.19 33.24 2.36 5.39 
Uuzbekistan 68.4 12.24 43.55 38.04 2.27 3.84 
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 Support for democracy within each country 
 
 
Table A5. Indices of Ddemocracy and Ccountry Rrankings 
 
 and Country Rankings 
  FREEDOM HOUSE         BTI POLITY IV 
  
Democracy 
(Nations in 
Ttransit)  
(i) 
Freedom 
in the 
World  
(ii) 
Ranking Democracy 
indicator 
(iv) 
Polity  (v) 
 Consolidated democ.     
Slovenia 1,.75 95 1   
Estonia 1,.96 95 2 7 6 
Slovakia 1,.96 91 5 9 9 
Hungary 2 93 4 10 10 
Latvia 2,.07 89 9 8 8 
Poland 2,.14 92 7 10 10 
Lithuania 2,.21 90 6 10 10 
Czech Rep. 2,.25 92 3 10 10 
Bulgaria 2,.93 98 10 9 9 
    
Romania 3,.39 75 11 9 9 
Croatia 3,.71 84 8 7 7 
Serbia 3,.71 76(vi) 14 (vi) 6 (vi) 6 (vi) 
Albania 3,.79 63 16 7 7 
Macedonia 3,.82 61 12 9 9 
Montenegro 3,.89 NA NA NA NA 
    
Bosnia 4,.07 62 17 NA NA 
Ukraine 4,.21 72 13 6 6 
Georgia 4,.86 61 21 7 7 
Moldova 4,.96 57 23 8 8 
    
Armenia 5,.14 41 19 5 5 
Kyrgyzstan 5,.64 47 24 4 -3 
Russia 5,.75 35 20 7 7 
Tajikistan 5,.93 30 27 1 -3 
Azerbaijan 5,.93 33 25 0 -7 
    
Kazakhstan 6,.39 32 22 0 -6 
Belarus 6,.71 15 26 0 -7 
Uzbekistan 6,.82 3 28 0 -9 
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Mongolia NA 83 18 10 10 
Turkey NA 65 15 8 7 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Freedom House BTI (iii) Polity IV  
 
 
  
  
Democracy 
(Nations in 
transit) (i) 
Ranking 
2006 
Freedom in 
the World  
(ii) 
Ranking 
Freed. World 
2006 Ranking 
Democracy 
indicator 
(iv) 
Polity  
(v) 
Slovenia 1.75 1 92 3 1 10 10 
Estonia 1.96 2 95 1 2 7 6 
Slovakia 1.96 3 91 6 5 9 9 
Hungary 2 4 93 2 4 10 10 
Latvia 2.07 5 89 8 9 8 8 
Poland 2.14 6 92 3 7 10 10 
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Lithuania 2.21 7 90 7 6 10 10 
Czech Rep. 2.25 8 92 3 3 10 10 
Bulgaria 2.93 9 98 9 10 9 9 
Romania 3.39 10 75 13 11 9 9 
Croatia 3.71 11 84 10 8 7 7 
Serbia 3.71 12 76 (S&M) 12 14 (S&M) 6 (S&M) 6 (S&M)
Albania 3.79 13 63 16 16 7 7 
Macedonia 3.82 14 61 18 12 9 9 
Montenegro 3.89 15 NA NA NA NA NA 
Bosnia 4.07 16 62 17 17 NA NA 
Ukraine 4.21 17 72 14 13 6 6 
Georgia 4.86 18 61 18 21 7 7 
Moldova 4.96 19 57 20 23 8 8 
Armenia 5.14 20 41 22 19 5 5 
Kyrgyzstan 5.64 21 47 21 24 4 -3 
Russia 5.75 22 35 23 20 7 7 
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Tajikistan 5.93 23 30 26 27 1 -3 
Azerbaijan 5.93 24 33 24 25 0 -7 
Kazakhstan 6.39 25 32 25 22 0 -6 
Belarus 6.71 26 15 27 26 0 -7 
Uzbekistan 6.82 27 3 28 28 0 -9 
Mongolia NA NA 83 11 18 10 10 
Turkey NA NA 65 15 15 8 7 
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(i) The democracy score ratings from Nations in Transit survey by Freedom House are based 
on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the 
lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for electoral process,; civil society,; 
independent media,;  independence of the judicial system,; and corruption. 
 
(ii) The Freedom in the World survey provides an annual evaluation of the state of global 
freedom as experienced by individuals. The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 
political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions 
encompass electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of the 
government. The civil liberties questions are concerned with freedom of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights. The highest number of points that can be awarded to the political rights 
checklist is 40, and that to the civil liberties checklist is 60, with the highest score indicating 
more freedom. This index is thus more global than the democracy index and more concerned 
with the actual rights and social freedoms enjoyed by individuals. 
  
(iii) The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) is a global ranking that analyzes and 
evaluates development and transformation processes in 119 countries. This index is however 
not only concerned with democracy, but also with the development of the market economy in 
each country, and for that reason, is less well suited than indicators purely concerned with 
democracy for our identification strategy.  
(iv) The Polity IV Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10), which is a 
weighted indicator of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.  
(v) The Polity indicator from Polity IV is a combined polity score that is computed by 
subtracting the ‘autocracy score’, which indicates how restricted or suppressed political 
participation is, to the democracy score. A negative ranking thus signifies that autocratic 
characteristics of a regime outweigh its democracy characteristics.  
(vi) Serbia and Montenegro are pooled.  
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Table A6. Indices of Industrial Market Development at Frontier-Zones 
 
Frontier-Zone i j Frontier zone i Country_i Frontier zone 
j 
Country j 
Albania Montenegro 2.27 2.36 2.43 2.24 
Armenia Georgia 2.00 2.36 2.38 2.24 
Azerbaijan Georgia 1.89 1.89 2.25 2.24 
Belarus Lithuania 1.95 1.92 2.53 2.70 
Belarus Poland 2.04 1.92 2.03 2.38 
Belarus Russia 2.00 1.92 2.00 2.38 
Belarus Ukraine 2.14 1.92 2.21 2.33 
Bosnia Croatia 2.42 2.38 2.38 2.37 
Bosnia Serbia 2.56 2.38 2.12 2.25 
Bulgaria Macedonia 2.47 2.62 2.18 2.29 
Croatia Bosnia 2.38 2.37 2.42 2.38 
Croatia Slovenia 2.31 2.37 2.19 2.25 
Czech Poland 2.62 2.61 2.26 2.38 
Czech Slovakia 2.80 2.61 2.28 2.49 
Estonia Russia 2.34 2.74 2.55 2.38 
Estonia Latvia 3.14 2.33 2.27 2.80 
Kazakh-Kyrgyzstan 2.65 2.48 2.32 2.25 
Kazakhstan Russia 2.57 2.48 2.38 2.38 
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan 2.00 2.25 2.55 2.20 
Latvia Lithuania 2.91 2.80 2.96 2.70 
Macedonia Serbia 2.15 2.29 2.50 2.25 
Moldova Romania 2.35 2.26 2.93 2.56 
Poland Slovakia 2.58 2.38 2.55 2.49 
Poland Ukraine 2.27 2.38 3.14 2.33 
Romania Serbia 2.53 2.56 2.29 2.25 
Russia Ukraine 2.47 2.38 2.40 2.33 
Slovakia Ukraine 3.00 2.49 2.67 2.33 
  
